




THE JAINA PRAYER

("A thesis, submitted to and approved by the
University of Calcutta, for Sir Asutosh Mukherji
Medal in letters for the year, 1955")

By

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PREFACE

In this Essay, an attempt has been made to bring out the implications of the Jaina Prayer,—called The Namaskāra-Mahā-Mantra,—in a full and clear manner. This has involved incidentally, a discussion of the Jaina theory of God also,—which has been done on a comparative basis. It is hoped that the book will be interesting to both the Jaina and the non-Jaina Scholars.

Howrah,
1-4-1957

The Author

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THE JAINA PRAYER OR ŚRĪ NAMĀSKARA MAHĀ-MANTRA

CHAPTER I.

THE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE NAMASKĀRA MAHĀMANTRA

Namō Arihantānam : Namō Siddhānam : Namō
Āyāriyānam : Namō Uvajjhāyānam : Namō Loē
Savva-Sāhunām :

Obeisance to the Arhats : Obeisance to the
Siddhas : Obeisance to the Ācāryyas : Obeisance
to the Upādhyāyas : Obeisance to all the Sādhus
in the Universe.

The above is the great Mantra which a devout
Jaina is enjoined on repeating and contemplating
in all veneration with all his heart, spirit and soul.
The full significance, utility and efficacy of it will
appear as we proceed. For the present we shall
confine ourselves to a consideration of some impor-
tant preliminaries which will facilitate a correct
understanding of the subject and thus put us on
the way to a complete grasp of it in all its aspects.

Shortly speaking, the Mahā-Mantra is a Jaina
religious formula, comparable to the Gāyatrī of the
Vēdic school, to the Lord's Prayer of the Christians
and to the Kalmā of Islam. Accordingly, the
view-points from which the Jaina Maha-Mantra is

to be judged are the various considerations which are connected with the fundamentals of religion itself.

It may be admitted that in some sense, all religions, at least the Indo-Aryan forms of them, are "Theanthropic" i. e. consist in the establishment or acknowledgment of a close relationship between God (whatever one may mean by the term) and man. Thus, the Dyaus-pitar (Vēdic), Jupiter (Roman), Diespiter (Greek), Marspiter, Alfode (Old German), which are names for the supreme gods, —all indicate 'father'. In the Avesta, the Ahuro-majda is often addressed as "The father". Not unoften, some of the gods are conceived as 'The brother', 'The friend', or 'The companion'. The Sanskrit word for the god Mitra and the Iranian equivalent for it, Mithra, mean 'a friend.' Similarly, the words Aryaman (Vēdic) and Airiyaman (Iranian) signify 'one who is a companion'. The god of a religion, however much superhuman and transcendental any religion may make him in its own way, is essentially connected with the nature of man.

One of the fundamental characteristics of God imputed to him by all religions, is his 'self-existence,' happily described as 'self-luminosity'. The names of the gods, 'Dēva', 'Dyaus', 'Diti', 'Aditi' etc, are all derived from the root, 'Div', 'to shine'. Similar is the case with the appellations for the gods, Dione, Dionysus, Dionis, Dianus, Diana and Juno. Diva (Latin), Daiva and Deiwys (Iranian), Dusas (Litth), Tivar (Norse), Dia (Irish) and Dew (Cyne) point also to the same or a similar root.

The God of a religion is thus completely independent and self-illuminative. In the same manner. Manu, Minos, Minerva and Moneta, the exalted beings in different religions, are connected with the root, 'man' (to think),—indicating thereby that the divinity is not an unconscious principle but a cognising conscious being. Intuition which signifies both immediate self-consciousness and other-consciousness and cognition, these two pertain to the very nature of God.

It is next to be noted that however much the difference may be in the conceptions of the Norse Odin, and the Finnie Ukko, the Vēdic Indra and the Thunder-god of the Brazilian aborigines as well as the Olympian Deus, all these gods are essentially mighty beings. Their powers over nature are more or less boundless. In poly-daemonisitic religions, all things, living and moving, all phenomena, strange and extra-ordinary, are supposed to be dominated and ruled by powerful spirits who move freely and mysteriously through earth and air. In the partially anthropic polytheisms or magical religions again, which are generally held to be purer than the poly-daemonic, gods appear to be supremely mighty in a similar manner, although their powers make an approach to those of an animal or a conscious being,—as is evidenced by their gods having either human bodies with heads of animals or the bodies of animals with human heads. Lastly, in the anthropomorphic form of poly-theism which is better and more well advanced than the two preceding forms of it just considered, gods show ethical tendencies but are nevertheless

supposed to be lords over the forces of nature and to be reigning over all its departments. Supreme powerfulness in some form or other, is thus attributed to God by all religions, from the lowest to the highest.

The last but not the least of the attributes of God is a state of happiness in him. This happiness in God is variously conceived in the various religions. The Norwegian gods found this joy in the continuous warfares which they carried on in the heavenly region. The Indra of the Vēdic religion as well as the other gods were immeasurably happy in drinking the Sōma, which their devotees offered to them and which was carried to them by Agni, the divine messenger. As a matter of fact, the Sōma-sacrifice of the Indians and the Haoma-sacrifice of the Iranians, as well as the various other forms of sacrifice, current among the ancient races were intended only to awaken or augment the state of joy in the gods.

Roughly speaking, then, intuition, cognition, power and joy were attributed to the gods or God by all the religions. This, however, does not mean that all the religions, old or current, are to be judged to have been on the same level. For, although the ascription of the said four attributes to the gods can be traced in all the religions, the dogmas and creeds are varied in different religions. In a word, it may be said that while in the old and the naturistic religions, those attributes scarcely rise above the grossly material level, they take a definitely ethical turn, in what we look upon as the advanced religions. In these

latter, the old gods indulging in the exercise of their prodigious power in the realm of nature are nevertheless relegated to a subordinate position and the supreme godhead, although invested with equally tremendous powers, never has any necessity or inclination for using them. Rather, the power attributed to the supreme God is his eternal power of self-preservation and a never-exhausted life-power of self-continuance, in and through his own inherent spontaneity alone. In the same manner in the ethical religions, the divine attributes of intuition, joy and cognition are made more and more independent of the external factors. In other words, the four qualities of God are conceived as uninterrupted flow of ever-surgings waves within the nature of divinity itself. In the ethical religions, God is a perfect being, in whom power is infinite, intuition unbounded, joy constant and knowledge omniscience itself.

Yet the perfection of the four divine attributes in the advanced religions, is accounted for in different ways in different religions. It may be said that in Islam, Judaism and Christianity, God is conceived as an outside being, operating in or upon the world from without. The whole realm of nature is his creation ; the material universe is his handicraft and bows down to his infinite power ; his joy is the joy of creation ; his boundless vision and omniscience are bound up with his attachment to the outside universe. The theory of such a creator-God may be met with in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and in the Vēdānta systems of thought also. But however sublime the conception of the

creator-God may appear to be, the initial difficulties in its way are not to be lost sight of and as a matter of fact, have not been passed over. For, curious questions have always arisen in connection with God's act of creation. If God creates, it must be to satisfy some inclination within him, to remove some wants or imperfections in him. This makes God clearly imperfect. The Sāṅkhya thinkers could not accept the theory of the Creator-God on this account. It has been contended that God creates because it is his nature to create, or as the Vēdānta puts it, it is his eternal Līlā to surround himself with his subservient creations. It is doubtful if God's perfection can be safeguarded in this way. If the world is the handicraft of a perfect being how is it that so much sorrow, want and iniquities should torment his creatures? The deistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the theistic Vēdānta attempted to explain away the miseries of the creatures by saying that these are due, not to the wishes of God but to the beginning-less Karma or the series of actions on the part of the creatures themselves. A serious thinker may yet feel difficulty in accepting this explanation as completely satisfactory. One may not go so far as to agree with Buddhism that misery is the essence of all existence, but that there are miseries in the world is an undeniable fact. The questioning spirit would wonder what would be the use of the hypothesis of the Creator-God at all, if he cannot be made responsible for the woes and troubles of the creatures and if these are to be accounted for by the acts of the creatures themselves. It may

be asked ;—Why not eliminate the outside creator-God altogether and make the creatures creators of themselves in and through their own Karma ?

Buddhistic theory of the existential misery implied a criticism of the theory of a Creator-God but failed to give a consistent explanation of creation. Buddhism was based on an absolute denial of all realities,—in other words, on the acceptance of a perfectly unsubstantial void at the basis of what we call real. According to it, a creature is not real, being only a series of non-existent points and therefore, the question of creation does not really arise for it—although in the same breath, it admits with questionable consistency that the miseries of creatures are due to Tanhā or unquenchable thirst for existence on the part of the creatures themselves.

It seems that all the foregoing difficulties regarding the theory of God arise from his conception as a transcendental being, operating upon the universe from without. Accordingly, the way out of these difficulties seems to be to hold, firstly, that a creature or a soul is a really existent being ; secondly that it is essentially possessed of the four perfect attributes of joy, intuition, knowledge and power ; thirdly, that it itself is responsible for its own miseries—in other words, that it is its own God, the creator, in and through its own Karma ; and lastly, that it is finally established in its own perfect nature, consisting in the four infinities of power, knowledge, joy and intuition, as soon as it detaches itself completely from the shackles of Karma. Credit is certainly due to the early

sophists of Greece who made 'man the measure of all things' and to Auguste Comte who denied the theory of the Creator-God and held up man as the all-important being. But the essentially irreligious tendency of sophism and the absolute secularism of the Comtian school prevented them from endowing man with godhood with its four infinities of perfection. It is thus safe to conclude that in a rational religion, while the outside creator-God is eliminated on the one hand, the individual soul in its essence, on the other, is acknowledged as being possessed of the four perfect divine attributes so that God is the fully developed soul and so far as the mundane sphere with its miseries and imperfections is concerned, the soul limited and finilised by its own Karma is the Creator of its own existential series.

It is interesting to find how the thinkers of the Sāṅkhya school are inclined to take up this position, step by step. We have already seen how they are opposed to the theory of a transcendent creator-God. Some of them suggest that the Prakṛti or the primordial cosmic principle of unconscious Matter may be looked upon as the Creator of the Universe. Yet they admit that in the matter of creation Prakṛti has not the absolute or unfettered discretion. There are variations and varieties (Vaicitrya) in the world and these are to be accounted for by the principle of Karma. This admission practically detracts a great deal from the self-sufficiency of Prakṛti and makes us look to the soul as the creative principle. As regards God as the perfect being, the Sāṅkhya

position clearly is that it is the liberated soul that can alone lay claim to such divinity. The Yōga philosophy also develops the theory of God as a perfect being in whom knowledge, power etc., can be found to an extent of infinite perfection. But the Yōga philosophers reserve this perfect status for one single being whom they call Īśvara and are not inclined to grant this status even to a fully liberated soul. Almost the same is the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers who attribute perfection only to the creator-God. Their further view is that a soul's liberation consists in its being absolutely shorn of all its attributes e.g. cognition etc. and that as such, a liberated soul, far from being possessed of the infinities of power, joy, intuition and knowledge is practically no better than an unconscious piece of stone. The Vēdānta ascribes perfection to the creator-God and holds that existence, joy and knowledge appear in a liberated soul in their perfect form. Yet, by identifying the individual liberated souls with the one unvaried Paramātmā and by looking upon this ultimate Paramātmā as strictly Nirguṇa, the Vēdānta makes the attributes of joy etc. in the liberated soul practically colourless and the attainment by it, of perfect Godhood thoroughly unmeaning.

In the next place, it is to be considered how one comes to an understanding of the nature of God and the fundamental ideas of a religion. In this connection, we may refer to what may be called the Instinct-theory of religious ideas, according to which these viz., the God-consciousness and the

ideas of man's relationship to God, are innate in man. This theory,—at least a main portion of it has been rejected. It has been replaced by the Intuitionist theory that what is innate in man is nothing more than a vague tendency to believe in some being or beings higher than man and a mental effort to enter into a relationship with them. The Intuitionists maintain that this innate tendency is capable of development and that as a matter of fact, upon that innate basis, full-fledged religious consciousnesses have been built up by various factors. Anselm's famous ontological argument which was further elaborated by Descartes, asserted that we have an intuition of absolute perfection and his contention was that since perfection implied actual existence, we must posit the reality of a perfect God. To many, again, the inference about the real existence of God from the intuitive idea of perfection in us has justly appeared to be unwarrantable. The Cartesian ontological argument was criticised by Kant according to whom, the ideas of God and of human freedom and responsibility as well as of future life were postulates of 'practical reason' i. e. indispensable requisites for a truly ethical act. Schliermacher, on the other hand laid stress on the emotional side of the human mind and attributed religious consciousness to this. Other thinkers of the post-Kantian school looked upon God as 'a projection' or a necessary personification outside, on analogical lines, of the human personality.

Not satisfied with these subjective or purely idealistic accounts of the development of religious

consciousness, the theistic thinkers of the modern naturalistic school have taken to the study of nature and natural phenomena and from the observation of the wonderful evidences of design and intelligent workings in them, conclude that there must be a skilful world-architect, God at their back. That was exactly the argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theists in India also. In other words, according to these naturalistic Theists, one would get the idea of an intelligent God from a study of the wonderful phenomena of nature. The ultra-evolutionists of recent times, on the contrary, point out that nature does not reveal any God. In other words, the explanation of all natural phenomena and of evolution of nature, organic and inorganic, is possible according to them, without "the hypothesis of God", as Laplace has said. At any rate, it may be said, as we have already seen, that even if a study of nature leads one to posit the existence of an intelligent creator. God, this God cannot be held to be a perfect being, his handicraft, the Universe being full of so many imperfections, facts of "dysteleology", as they have been called. Finding nature-study not to be a sure or safe indicator of God, some have held the God-consciousness to have been a matter of gradual evolution in the human races, "a collective product"—to quote the words of Prof. W. D. Whitney, "of the wisdom of a community, the unconscious growth of generations". Prof. Whitney calls the religion which thus slowly evolves from "the wisdom of a community", extending over "generations", a race-religion and distinguishes from it

“a religion proceeding from an individual founder, who.....makes headway against formality and superstition and recalls his fellowmen to sincere and intelligent faith in a new body of doctrines of specially moral aspect to which he himself gives shape and coherence.” A clear-cut distinction is thus made between what may be called the ‘national’ and the ‘individual’ religions, in other words between a ‘natural’ and a ‘revealed’ religion, the former being gradually evolved (unconsciously) in a race or community, the latter emanating directly (and suddenly too) from a gifted individual who is looked upon as ‘the founder of the religion’, ‘an inspired hero’, ‘a prophet’ or ‘the Son of God’, ‘the incarnation of the highest’,. Professor Max Muller, however, refuses to recognise the distinction as an absolute one. On the one hand, it is urged that what is called “the wisdom of a community” is after all the wisdom of its enlightened members, that is, of individuals and on the other hand the so-called founders of religions are no more than “the leading representatives of the better insight and feeling of their time.” Thus, Prof. Max Muller observed that though neither a Brāhmaṇa nor a Greek nor a Roman could give the names of any individuals who founded their religions, one could yet discover in their national religions the unmistakable influences of individual minds. All race or national religions are in this respect individual religions. On the other hand, it is also urged that the individual founders of religions or Prophets were only the heads of their contemporaries in whom the advanced thoughts of the community culmi-

nated and who preached only what lay hidden and lived unspoken in the hearts of this generation. Viewed in this light, all individual and revealed religions appear to be race and national religions.

The theory of evolution has now-a-days captured the imagination of all investigators to a remarkable extent. All phenomena, physical, physiological, mental, social, political are attractively explained as the products of slow, gradual and uninterrupted evolution and there is no wonder that even religion and the conception of God itself should be subjected to the laws of the evolutionary growth. We do not deny that environments do exert an influence over the religious ideas of a people and certainly modify them to a certain extent. It may further be admitted that in the history of a religion, there have often been many changes, reforms and reactions from time to time for better or worse, brought about by exigencies of circumstances and the demands of surrounding environments. But to argue from this that the very fundamentals of all religions e. g. the original conception of God as a being of infinite power, intuition, joy and knowledge are the products of a slow social evolution, is hardly justifiable. Investigations have shown that even the most primitive of religions contained the germs of all later growth and however much naturistic and crude they might appear to be they bore unmistakable traces of humanistic and moral feelings inseparable from them. As regards reforms and periodic reactions in religious communities, C. P. Tiele at one place points out : "We know the names of the kings or

tyrants or other individuals who made them. Who knows if the same was not the case when these religions were born, if what now seems to be the collective product of the wisdom of the community was not simply the product of a tyrant's, a mighty chieftain's conduct, or of a renowned magician's influence ?" Every religion is, in this sense a revealed and individual religion, its founder or periodic founders revealing new and fragrant principles by their word and life. It cannot be claimed that these original and basic principles of especially moral aspect were the products of social evolution. Evolution, as is generally conceived, is not always an unbroken growth. De Vries and others have shown how even the process of organic evolution is, at stages, suddenly discontinuous and inexplicably creative. In the religious sphere, the course of current ideas was at marked points similarly turned and changed by new matters emanating from heroes or divine seers and these new matters had clearly been beyond the ken of the people of the time before they were revealed by those religious heroes and divine seers.

Notwithstanding all that is said to the contrary much may accordingly be said in favour of the view that at the back of a religion, there is always a seer or a body of seers who reveal its fundamentals and the religion owes its authoritative character to its being a revelation from them. This, however, does not mean that there is no difference between the various religions, all of them having been revealed in some sense. In religions which believe in a transcendent creator-God, it is either the God

or his chosen one, the Messiah or the Prophet who reveals the first principles of religion. A rational or rigidly ethical religion, on the contrary, as we have seen,—recognises no outside God but looks upon the emancipated soul as the God ; to such a religion, it is accordingly the finally freed soul which is the only Revealer. It is true that not all the emancipated beings, in spite of their unquestionable Godhood, have been teachers of mankind. But that some of these supreme beings have revealed the religious truth and the way to salvation which they themselves have seen and realised is emphatically asserted by the rational religion ; for, otherwise, as it points out and the view seems to be reasonable, the authority of the revelation would be questioned. A rational religion thus formulates that the creator is neither the supreme God nor even an outside being but that it is the unemancipated soul, subjected to the feelings of attachment and aversion, which creates its own world, that the finally freed beings are alone the supreme Gods, possessed of the infinities of power, bliss, intuition and cognition and that some of these supreme Gods again are the revealers of the fundamentals of a true religion and of the conception of the true God himself.

A word or two may here be said about the authoritative character of the Revelation. Every revealed religion points out that the Revelation is authoritative and must be accepted as true, because its Revealer is a supreme being or the embodiment of truths themselves. The Avestā, according to the Zoroastrians is authoritative

because it was revealed to and by the correctest of Seers as true. The Jewish Testament, the New Testament of the Christians, as well as the holy book of Islam are authoritative, being deliveries from or to venerable prophets. It is interesting to see how while all the Vēdic schools admitted the authoritative character of the Scripture, they differed among themselves as regards its reason. The Mīmāṃsā was not a believer in the doctrine of the Creator-God ; according to it the Vēdās are not the compositions of any being but are self-existent and eternal ; they embody the eternal truths themselves about man's duties and their authority is not to be questioned accordingly. The Sāṃkhya philosophy also did not believe in a creator-God but it differed from the Mīmāṃsā as regards the latter's doctrine about the eternal existence of the Vēdas. Still, the Sāṃkhya thinkers refused to look upon the Vēdas as unauthoritative in any way and agreed with the Mīmāṃsā that they were Apauruṣēya i.e. not composed by any being. It is in the Nyāya, the Vaiśēṣika and the Vēdānta systems that one comes across the doctrine that the Vēdas are the product of the supreme creator's intelligence and that for that reason, they are authoritative. In a rational religion, as we have seen, the reality of a supreme creator-God is denied. Hence according to it, the Revelation comes from a perfectly emancipated soul and it derives its authoritative character from the fact that its Revealer, the freed soul, being possessed of Omniscience and perfectly clear intuition saw the eternal verities as they were and

being absolutely free from all taints of selfishness or deceitfulness or any feeling of attachment or envy, delivered these truths to his hearers exactly as he saw and realised them. The position of the Jaina philosophy as regards Revelation was somewhat such. According to it, the Revelation comes from the clear-visioned, eternally free, omniscient Being, Whom it calls *Īśvara*. The *Īśvara* is also devoid of all feelings of selfish attachment or aversion etc., etc., and hence it can be said that He saw the truths as they were and He taught them also as they were. The Revelation is authoritative, coming, as it does, from the all-perfect *Īśvara*. The *Yōga* philosophers while admitting all this, reserves, however, this Revealerhood for one, single Being,—not as one who through self-evolution and self-culture attains perfection but as one who is not only eternally self-existent but as eternally pure, perfect and free also.

The questioning mind of man has seldom been satisfied with being told that his religion has been the revelation from God and that, as such, it should unhesitatingly accept its tenets. It has always demanded a more rational justification for the acceptance of the so-called revealed doctrines. The history of the mediaeval Scholasticism in Europe has been an interesting instance of this. Scotus Erigena felt the rising demands for an explanation of religious dogmas and asserted that there was no divergence between reason and faith. According to him, the true religion was true philosophy and vice versa. Erigena contended that tenets of a true religion were

consistent with reason and that similarly a matter established by reason was nothing more or less than a religious principle. Abelard however, could not agree with Erigena that the deliveries of reason and faith were necessarily identical. Abelard had distinct leanings towards reason and attributed to its product, a decisive character. He advocated the application of rational criticism and explanation to the contents of faith. Notwithstanding the assertion of Erigena and his school about the identity of the matters of faith and reason, there was an under-current of feeling among the thinkers of the middle age that the contents of faith and reason might after all differ and if Abelard upheld the dignity of reason, Hugo and Victorines denounced it and declared that the matters of faith were supreme and untouched by the criticism of reason. Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, tried to bridge the gulf between reason and faith and held that it was reason's business always to support the matters of faith. So far, however, as the religious doctrines of the age were concerned, it was apparent to Duns Scotus and his followers that many religious dogmas could not be reconciled to reason. To save these religious dogmas accordingly, they drew a distinction between the truths of natural light (reason) and truths of supernatural 'grace'. The latter were revealed i. e. products of revelation, utterly inaccessible to reason. This differentiation between matters of faith and reason was due to Scotus' realisation of the fact that if reason is

brought to bear on an examination of the contents of faith, it may not always assist or confirm the theological doctrines but may, not unoften, attack or criticise them. This dualism ended in a further dualism between revelation and reason, a contention that although a fact might be true according to reason, its opposite was true according to revelation. What happened next was just to deny this dualism, to dislodge faith from the high position it held so long in the domain of serious thought, to declare the supreme sovereignty of reason and finally to deny the truth of what was opposed to reason, even if it was a matter of faith, an end of Scholasticism.

The above history of the rise and fall of European Scholasticism shows that much that is often put forward as divine revelation is questionable. Genuine revelation is never afraid of the tests of reason being applied to it. That is the demand of human mind and no revelation can support itself, if it ignores it. The words of God, a Seer or a Prophet can be accepted as such and as authoritative, only if they are corroborated by reason. A distinction between revealed truths and reasoned truths is not permissible—the former must not go against the latter if their claim to being veridical is to be upheld. The principle and the test of a rational religion are that what it asserts to be the words of God and its fundamental tenets or dogmas should on no account contradict the truths of reason. In India, as we have already noted, the Vēdic school always upheld the authoritative nature of the scripture and yet felt the

necessity of demonstrating its acceptability. The thinkers of the various schools of Vēdic philosophy, divided the acts enjoined in the Scripture, into two kinds viz. those, the effects of which can be experienced in this life and those, which are to yield their good fruits in a future life. They pointed out that the efficacy of those scriptural acts which produced good effects in one's present life, was beyond question and they contended that if some of the Vēdic acts were thus right, the others i.e, those acts which were alleged to yield good fruits in the next life must be held to be right also. Whether the Vēdic injunctions were, as a matter of fact, the unfailing producers of the alleged enjoyable effects is not the question here; as a matter of fact, the non-Vēdic schools of philosophy in India never believed in this contention of the Vēdic thinkers. What, however, is of interest here, is to note that in India religious acts were not intended to rest on the sheer and simple weight of scriptural authority.

It may in the next place be pointed out that in every religion, God and the Revealer are not the only objects of veneration. Even in the positivistic religion of Comte, which has been condemned by its enemies as "Catholicism **minus** Christianity" and extolled by its admirers as "Catholicism **plus** Science," besides Humanity, the Great Being, a priesthood is recognised who by their moral power and greatness of character, by their intellectual eminence and their special knowledge of man and nature are to inspire confidence in and respect from all religiously disposed people. Similarly, in

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Buddhism, one is to offer allegiance not only to Dharma (the Cosmic Law, identifiable in some sense with the Supreme abstract God) and Buddha (practically, the Seer and the Revealer of the Law) but to Sangha (the Brotherhood in faith). In Judaism, in a similar manner, we have, besides God (the transcendent Father of all) and the Messiah (the would-be Ruler of the believing world), the Synagogue or the Congregation, as the object of great veneration. In Christianity, we have the belief in the Trinity viz. of God. the Father, of Christ. the Revealer of the religious principles and of the Holy Spirit. Interpreters of Trinity have no doubt differed as to the true meaning of the third principle of the Holy Spirit. One view has been that the Holy Spirit refers to the "change of heart" which the Christians undergo by their faith in the Christian doctrines. The other view is that the Holy Spirit stands for the unity which the Christians experience among themselves. In other words, it comprises "the whole body of the glorified, consisting of.....the spirits of the just made perfect who have been redeemed by the merits.....of the divine Head of the Church, Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God." The Holy Spirit is thus the Church, which, notwithstanding its conception as 'invisible' by the Calvinists, is regarded as 'visible' by the Lutherans, the Roman Catholics, the Oriental Christians and the majority of the noted Anglican divines. The Holy Spirit or 'the visible Church of God' which should be respected by all believers, thus includes all masters and interpreters of the revealed words of God,—or,

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in the words of the nineteenth Article of the English Church, "a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure word of God is preached and the sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same." Without pursuing the matter any further, we may say that a rational religion insists always on a spirit of veneration in its faithful followers for the band of those high-souled masters who by their self-culture and character look straight to the principles of religion and preach and interpret them to honest enquirers.

The accounts above show the nature of God and Beings whom a rational religion venerates. Religion establishes a close connection between those revered objects and a believer. To establish, effectuate or realise that connection, a religion prescribes various rites, formulas and practices. Accordingly, the goodness or soundness of any of these must ultimately be judged by its efficacy regarding that God-man-connection, which it is the supreme goal of a rational religion to bring about. Coming back to the Mahā-Mantra, one may examine it in its twofold aspects viz. the theoretical and the practical. Does it refer to a God or Gods and Venerable Beings as the objects of one's worshipful respect in strict accordance with the principles of and conclusions of a rational religion, as pointed out above? This is the theoretical aspect of the Mahā-Mantra. In the next place, from the viewpoint of practice and procedure, one asks: Does the Mahā-Mantra insist on a manner of attitude

which is best suited to one's realisation of the highest goal of his life viz. the closest possible relationship between himself and the Supreme Being? These are the two standpoints, one, the theoretēcal and the other, the procedural from which we propose to look to the implications of the Mahā-Mantra.

CHAPTER II.

THE MAHĀ-MANTRA.

Before we examine the theoretical implications of the Mahā-Mantra in which we are mainly interested, we may shortly refer to the verbal nature of it. We began the present essay with a statement of the Mantra in full, which on word-analysis, will be found to consist of 35 letters. It is said that this extent-in-letters may be increased or decreased in accordance with the occasions, the needs and the ability of a devotee. For instance, instead of uttering the full formula with its 35 letters viz.

-Namō Arihantānam : Namō Siddhānam : Namō Āyāriyanam : Namō Uvajjhāyānam : Namō Loṇḍavva-Sāhunam-

one may curtail the extent of the Mantra to a collection of 16 letters in the following manner :—

-Arihanta Siddha Āyiriya Uvajjhāyā Sahu.

It would be seen that in the curtailed formula, only the names of the five groups of the Great

Beings are uttered. At times, the extent of the Mantra is decreased to a collection of 6 letters, either.

- (1) Arihanta Siddhā (A-ri-ha-nta Si-ddha)
 or, (2) Arihanta Sisā (A-ri-ha-nta Si-sa)
 or, (3) Ōm Namō Siddhānam (Ōm-Na-mō Si-ddhā-nam).

The formula consists sometimes again in 5 letters, each of which is only the first letter in the respective names of the five classes of Great Beings.

A—(the first letter in the word, Arihanta)

Si—(the first letter in the word, Siddha)

Ā—(the first letter in the word, Ācārya)

U—(the first letter in the word, Upadhyāya)

Sā—(the first letter in the word, Sādhu)

The Mantra in the following four-lettered forms also is recommended,—

(1) A—(the first letter in Arihanta)

Si—(the first letter in Siddha)

Sā—hu.

(2) A—ra-ha-nta.

The formula is sometimes curtailed to 2 letters in any of the following three forms :—

(1) Si—ddha.

(2) A—Sā

(3) Om—ṇbī

The utterance of the single letter, Ōm, may sometimes take the place of the utterance of the entire formula of 35 letters. The mystic letter, Ōm, is held in high esteem by both the Vēdic and the non-Vēdic philosophers in India. Those thinkers according to whom, the word-sounds were the ultimate reality, contended that the universe

emerged from that mystic syllable and would ultimately lose itself in that,-that syllable, Ōm, alone being eternally self-existent. Others hold that the Creator created the world with the utterance of Ōm. It is said that all languages with their words were derived from that ultimate sound. It is also held that the syllable, Ōm, is constituted of the letters, A, U and M,-the first of which indicates the creative principle at the basis of the universe, the second, the power for its preservation and the third, the force that destroys the world at the end. Its efficacy in the religious and moral sphere is also unbounded. All rites, observances and moral practices are to begin and end with an utterance of Ōm. In fact, the philosophers of the Vēdic school go so far as to say that this one syllable is capable of bringing about the final liberation of man, besides the fulfilments of all kinds of desires. The Buddhist veneration for Ōm is no less pronounced. According to the Jaina's also the mystic syllable is supremely effective and significant and is constituted of the letters, A (the first letter in Arhat), A (the first letter in Aśarīra, meaning the disembodied i. e. the Siddha), Ā (the first letter in Ācārya), U (the first letter in Upādhyāya) and M (the first letter in Muni, meaning the abstemious i. e. the Sādhu). The Mahā-Mantra of 35 letters is thus compressed in the one-lettered sound, Ōm. According to some, the one letter, A, may sometimes stand for the thirty-five lettered Mantra.

We may now address ourselves to a study of the nature of the five groups of high-souled Beings,-

the Pança-Parameṣṭhi's, as they are called, viz. the Arhat, the Siddha, the Ācārya, the Upādhyāya and the Sādhu, who are the objects of supreme veneration to a Jaina and are indicated as such in the Mahā-Mantra.

THE ARHAT.

The word, Arhat, is very old. It is found in the Vēdas, being applied to objects of respect. In the Avesta, the word stands for one who is to be revered and the word in modified forms can be traced in most of the old Indo-Germanic languages. The Buddhists apply the name, Arhata to Lord Buddha. In the Jaina literature, the Arhat is so called because he receives Arhā or worship from gods on five occasions. It is to be remembered that the Arhat, although his essential soul, like the essential souls of all conscious beings, at all times is free, attains final liberation only in his last bodily existence on this earth, after series and series of such existences here and elsewhere. After the attainment of the final freedom, the soul of the Arhat no longer incarnates itself in the mundane spheres. The last embodied existence of the Arhat is accordingly the purest possible, because in and through this final embodiment he realises his true self. This last body of the Arhat is said to be Śubha or auspicious. This means that the Arhat-body 'is devoid of the seven Dhātus or unclean elements, is brilliant like the amalgamation

of a thousand suns and (although) gross, is of the best kind.' 'Thus perfectly stainless or **Niranjana** and containing a soul which is about to throw away the last shackles of Karma, the Arhat-body receives worship, Arhā, on five occasions from the superhuman beings of the high heavens. These five occasions of the worship of the Arhat-body are called the **Pan̄ca-Kalyāṇa** with respect to it. (i) The first of these **Kalyāṇas** or worshipping celebrations the **Garbha-Kalyāṇa**, is at the time when the soul of the Arhat descends from the highest of the celestial spheres to his mother's womb. It is said that for several months before that occasion, in the kingdom of the Arhat's father lacs of diamond-pieces used to come down, flowers from heaven's **Kalpa-tree** used to fall and other auspicious phenomena happened. (2) The second is the **Janma-Kalyāṇa**, celebrated by the gods when the Arhat is born. On this occasion, the mountain **Sumēru** puts on a splendid appearance. The King of the gods brings the newly born Arhat to this mountain and places him on a diamond-throne. The gods deck the body of Arhat with precious ornaments, garlands and clothes and pour on him the waters from the **Kṣīra-Sāgara** (the Ocean of Milk). After installing the Arhat on the throne in this way, the gods offer prayers to him. All this time, the gods put before the Arhat's parents a substitute for their son lest they be grieved at his loss. After the celebration is over, the gods bring back and put the child before the parents and leave the place with rejoicings. (3) Realising that the worldly posses-

sions are not to be stuck to, by a person who seeks liberation, when the Arhat decides to renounce them and adopt the life of a homeless recluse, the gods celebrate the third Kalyāṇa, called the Nihkramaṇa-Kalyāṇa. The King of the gods on this occasion, comes to the Arhat's palace with a palanquin of massive diamond. The Arhat amidst the rejoicings of the gods enters the divine palanquin. The palanquin is carried by the gods in pompous procession through crowds, until it reaches the outskirts of a lonely forest where the Arhat begins a new life, a life of penance and meditation. (4) The fourth Kalyāṇa, Kēvala-Jñāna-Kalyāṇa is similarly celebrated by the gods with music, deafening cheers, offering of prayers etc. etc. when the Arhat attains pure knowledge, consisting in omniscience, after years of self-culture and self-renunciation. (5) The Nirvāṇa-Kalyāṇa is the last Kalyāṇa and is celebrated by the gods when the Arhat gives up his mortal frame and passes up to the region of the immortal liberated beings. On this occasion, the gods come in great pomp, take the mortal remains of the Lord in great reverence and his teeth and bones in a diamond casket. The gods pour sandal and other scented substances on the sacred body and bow down their heads before it. The gods burn the body of the Lord in sacred fire. Thereafter, the sacred ashes as well as the bones and teeth of the Lord, already kept in a casket are triumphantly carried to the Kṣīra-Samudra, into the waters of which they are finally thrown.

The above are the five Kalyāṇas or celebrations

when the body of the Arhat receives Arhā or worship from the gods. With all this, however, it should never be forgotten that the Arhat is not the body but the soul attached to it for the time being. The Jaina thinkers point out that from the real (Niścaya) view-point, the Arhat is Aśarīra i. e. disembodied, although for all practical purposes (Vyavahāra) he is looked upon as encased in a body. It is the physical nature of the Arhat which is thus of real philosophical interest. To him are attributed no less than 1008 names, of which the Vītarāga i.e. 'one devoid of all feelings of attachment' is one. He is also called the Śuddha, pure, because of his being free from all the eighteen Dōṣas or debasing influences of fear, aversion, attachment, illusion, pride, displeasure, greed, grief etc. etc. He is said to be possessed of 12 excellent acquisitions. Of these, eight are called the Pratihārya and the rest, the Atiśaya. The former consist of some supernatural things as an uncommon umbrella, a precious seat, an extensive Aśōka-tree under which he holds his Assembly, a rain over him of heavenly flowers, a halo of light around him etc. etc. as well as a pleasing voice and such attractive matters. The Atiśayas are four in number viz. (1) Apāyāpagama-Atiśaya. This consists firstly in the unusual fact that no phenomena, however menacing, can injure him in any way, and secondly, in the strange fact of the absolute absence of all forms of disease and ailments in the people, living within a considerable distance from the places where he goes. (2) Jñāna-Atiśaya. This consists in the Arhat's omniscience or power of knowing all things (3) Puja-Atiśaya.

It means that the Arhat receives the respectful obeisance from all beings, however highplaced they may be. (4) *Vaṇana-Atiśaya*. It is the possession of a strange language which is intelligible to all his hearers simultaneously, without the help of interpreters.

Finite beings have their happinesses, powers and faculties of immediate apprehension and cognition but these are limited in them in various ways. This is too patent a fact to be elaborately explained. One, for example, is sometimes happy but not always ; his happiness is often followed by grief and is even considerably marred by the thoughts of unpleasant matters. One again has certain powers of body and mind, but these powers do not avail him always and to the extent desired, so that he cannot preserve himself permanently against defects, diseases and death. Some capacity for the immediate apprehension of reality and some powers of cognition are there in an animal, but when we compare the extent of matters known by a being with the extent of those that are beyond his ken, we find that the faculties of apprehension and cognition are considerably limited in the finite beings. Yet it is well known that the existing quantum of a being's happiness, his powers as well as his powers of apprehension and cognition are capable of being increased or decreased in various degrees. These facts of limitation and modification of a being's powers and capacities show that a state of bliss, the power of self-preservation and the powers of immediate apprehension of truths and knowledge are native or connate in a being and that it is some

obstacles foreign to the nature of the being which by their partial subsidence increase the stock of those native powers and faculties in the being and which by their accretion diminish the said stock. These obstacles to the free functioning of the native powers in a conscious being are collectively called the Ari (the enemy) or the Ghāti-Karma's or Destructive material forces, in the Jaina philosophical works. They are of four classes. Under the first class come those destructive forces which are called the Mohanīya or the Ari, **parexcellence**. The Mōhanīya are the most fundamental of the Karmas and the other forms of destructive forces are developed from them. The function of the Mōhanīya is just to delude the essential psychical faculties of right belief (Darśana) and right conation (Çāritra), generating various forms of wrong beliefs and passions. The native faculties of the soul being thus clouded by the Mōhanīya and wrong beliefs and passions reigning in the soul, the further influx of Karmic matter into the soul and as a result thereof, the further degradation of the psychical faculties become inevitable. The Karmas known as the Jñānāvaraṇa and the Darśanāvaraṇa, as their names suggest, suppress respectively in various manners the soul's native powers of right cognition and right faith; and the Antarāya Karmas obstruct the soul's charitable tendency, its powers of gaining and enjoying and the power of exercising its own capacities. The limitations in a finite being are thus caused by the influx and operations of foreign (Karmic or material) forces into its conscious principle.

In a finite being, more and more correct functioning of the psychical faculties is made possible only by the subsidence or mitigation of the Karmic forces. These are after all foreign to the essential nature of the soul and their repulsion from it, although undoubtedly difficult (on account of the closest intimacy between the soul and matter from the beginningless time) is not impracticable. This work of absolute separation of the soul from the Karmic matter of the "destructive" nature is successfully effected in the Arhat. He is on this account called the Arihanta, meaning 'one who has killed the Ari, i.e. the enemy, the Karmic forces that were active in his soul.' And the results of the Arhat's finally annihilating the four above-mentioned Ghāti Karmas can well be guessed. The destruction of the Darśanāvaraṇīya Karmas effects the evolution of the perfect Apprehension in him ; the destruction of the Antarāya effects the unfolding of perfect power ; infinite joy arises in him on account of the annihilation of the Mōhaniya Karma ; and infinite knowledge is evolved in him, due to the destruction of the Jñānāvaraṇīya. The attainment of these four Perfections of Joy, Power, Apprehension and Cognition, called the Ananta-çatuṣṭaya or the four Infinities, marks him as a finally liberated being.

The four Perfections are not dependent on anything external to the nature of the Arhat. He is the liberated being and as such is finally and securely established in his own self. If there are perfect joy, perfect apprehension, infinite power and infinite knowledge in him, these are all due exclusively to the nature of his own fundamental self and

arise in him, because and as soon as the obstacles to them which were so long sticking to his nature are removed. The Jainas express this by saying that the four Infinities are not in any way dependent on any outside factor but are due to the *Pariṇāma* or the self-evolving character of the freed soul.

Of the four Perfections essential to the nature of the Arhat, the attribute of perfect Cognition, the *Ananta-Jñāna* or the *Jñāna-Atiśaya*, may be considered here with a little more attention. The infinite knowledge ascribed to him, is nothing short of omniscience. That God is omniscient is a doctrine which is generally held to be indispensable. It is pointed out that if God be supposed to be a knowing being, Omniscience as an attribute of his nature cannot be denied. Human knowledge is admittedly relative and imperfect; if then God as a perfect being be supposed to be existent, his very existence as a Perfect being necessarily implies the completeness and infiniteness of his knowledge. From the negative datum of the existence of error in us and from the fragmentary and incomplete character of the knowledge of finite beings like us, St. Royce develops his theory of an All-knower. St. Augustine, on the other hand, proceeded on the positive line and argued from the undeniable existence of truth to the necessity of an absolute and infinite standard of truth. The Theistic thinkers rely on the empirical observation of the universe and from the evidences of wonderful design in it arrive at the idea of the creator as a perfectly Intelligent being. It is to be noticed that while the Infinite Wisdom of God is acknowledged by

some of the non-Indian thinkers of both past and present, the question of the possibility of human Omniscience does not seem to have been taken up by them seriously.

If, however, as many have contended, the constitution of the world does not show the evidences of perfect wisdom in its creator,—it being full of so many undesirable features betraying the imperfectness of his intelligence and thereby proving the incompetency of the theistic argument to prove the supposed world-creator's omniscience,—the force in Royce's and St. Augustine's lines of arguments must be acknowledged to a certain extent. The existence of Truth and Error presuppose a standard or ideal, absolutely free from all imperfections and incompleteness of knowledge. This ideal, as we have seen, is generally attributed to God, a transcendent being. But if error and apprehension of truth are found in one and the same man, it may plausibly be argued that a finite being is a victim of errors so long as his knowledge is clogged, that he apprehends truth when those clogs to his knowledge are removed to some extent and that when those obstacles to his knowledge completely subside, Omniscience is automatically evolved in him. Not of the alleged world-architect but of man and for the matter of that, of all conscious beings, Omniscience is thus the heritage.

In India, this question was discussed in right earnest. The theistic Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika attributed Omniscience to the divine Creator, as he was conceived to be the world-architect. The substance of their argument was that there were

infinite forms of Adṛṣṭa or fundamental force at the basis of individual existences, the infinite ways of their fruition, the infinite means and environments for those fruitions, the infinite number of atoms which served as materials for the embodiments of the infinite souls and material bodies existing and struggling in the universe and that all these substances and phenomena must be present in the infinite intelligence of God in order that he might operate as the world-architect, harmonising, as he did, all of them into the one Universe that we have. Substantially the same is the argument of the dualistic and the monistico-dualistic schools of the Vēdānta for the Omniscience of the Īśvara. Even the Māyā-Vāda section of the Vēdantic school which posits a Creator for the Vyavahārica or practical purposes admits his Omniscience on the same grounds. The philosophers of the Yōga school, while agreeing with the Sāṅkhya thinkers on the doctrine of the eternal self-existence of both Prakṛti (non-psychical principle) and the Puruṣas (conscious beings) find the necessity for a third cosmic being, without whose intervention, as Bhōja, in his commentary on the Yōga-Sūtras says the conjunction and the separation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa (which are the respective causes of the creation and the annihilation of the world) are impossible and who, on that account, is necessarily All-knowing. The philosophers of the Sāṅkhya school, however, are opposed to all these theistic lines of thought and openly deny the existence of an Omniscient world-creator, and in these their views, they are joined not only by the

non-Vēdic thinkers of the Buddhist and the Jaina schools but by the philosophers of the Vēdic Mimāmsā school also. With Buddhists, the question of divine omniscience cannot arise because they do not see any reasons for admitting the reality of any world-creator. A finally liberated being, according to them is 'Nirvāṇatā-gata' or 'one who has undergone Extinction.' There have been differences among scholars as to the real meaning of this Nirvāṇa or Extinction. From the Buddhist description of the Nirvāṇa as Khēman and Śivan (state of bliss), Saçcan (truth), Padan (final resort), some have argued that it is a supramundane state of infinite (Anantan and Açcutan) bliss,—while others maintain that the state of Nirvāṇa is like the state of the extinguishment of a light. If the latter meaning of Nirvāṇa is accepted, there is no sense in attributing omniscience to the so-called liberated being. Even if Nirvāṇa be taken in the sense of a blessed state of existence, Omniscience cannot be attributed to it. Because according to the Buddhists Taṇhā (thirst) and Vāsanā (apperception-traces) are at the root of all our Vēdanā or momentary apprehensions and cognitions. In Nirvāṇa, Taṇhā and Vāsanā are completely uprooted, so that with their non-operation, Vēdanā or cognition cannot arise at all in that state. Nirvāṇa cannot be attended with Omniscience accordingly.

The Buddhist philosophers, however, believe in Yōgi-pratyakṣa,—'a Sage's apprehension',—which, though a state lower than the Nirvāṇa, is akin to perfect knowledge. They point out that the

ordinary knowledge which we get of objects through the sources of our experience is Bhūtārtha or imperfect empirical knowledge about them. To contemplate the Bhūtārtha again and again is Bhūtārtha-Bhāvanā. As a result of this determined contemplation, the Bhūtārtha-Bhāvanā, the natures of the objects become clearer and clearer to the percipient. It has various stages, the Bhūtārtha-Bhāvanā-Prakarṣa, the last of which is called the Prakarṣa-Paryanta, from which is evolved a direct apprehension of the objects, an apprehension, in which the objects appear to the perceiving Sage as clear and as direct as "an Āmalaka-fruit in hand." The Buddhist Yōgi-pratyakṣa is omniscience in some sense i. e., in accordance with the Buddhist view of it and because the reputed founder of Buddhism was possessed of this supernatural vision, he is revered as the Arhat and the devout Buddhist worshipfully hails him, "Namō Bhagavatō Arahato Sammasam Buddhassa."

The Nyāya conception of liberation is distinguished from the Buddhist, at least in this respect that existence is unambiguously attributed to it by the former. Nevertheless, the thinkers of Nyāya school do not attribute omniscience to a liberated being. A finally freed soul, according to them, is absolutely devoid of all the nine psychical attributes and as such, is incapable of being endowed with omniscience. On the other hand, it is to be noted that notwithstanding their attribution of omniscience to Īśvara and non-attribution of it to a finally liberated being, the Nyāya thinkers are not opposed to the theory that at a certain stage of

psychical evolution, the human soul can obtain some sort of omniscience. They maintain that a Sage can acquire a power of knowing all things. It is no doubt impossible for an ordinary man to be simultaneously connected with more than one percept. The Naiyāyikas, nevertheless point out that recollections of all things or causes of the cognitions of all things may simultaneously present themselves to a sage who is thereby enabled to have a knowledge of the whole collection of objects. Such a knowledge has been called by them Samūhālambana, which consists thus in a form of collective knowledge and which may be likened to omniscience. In the same manner, the Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit the possibility of what they call Ārṣa-jñāna, 'The knowledge of a Seer' which is also akin to 'a knowledge of all things.'

So far as the matter of the final emancipation of a soul is concerned, the chief noticeable distinction between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on the one hand and the Sāṅkhya-Yōga on the other is that whereas consciousness is not attributable to a liberated being according to the former, it is 'Buddha' or conscious, according to the latter. Yet the consciousness attributed to an emancipated soul by the Sāṅkhya thinkers is completely colourless. No object, external to itself is its matter, because, as it is said, Prakṛti the other principle is finally detached from it. The liberated being is rigidly self-conscious and in its pure consciousness, no object other than itself is reflected. The emancipated being, as conceived in the Sāṅkhya-Yōga systems, cannot be omniscient accordingly.

We have seen how the Yōga philosophy attributes omniscience to *Īśvara*, the Cosmic Being who effects the union and the separation between the souls and the ultimate non-psychical Cosmic principle. According to the Sāṅkhya philosophers, *Prakṛti* is the basic and the sole operative principle in the cosmic evolution and some thinkers of the Sāṅkhya school are inclined to look upon the *Prakṛti* as an omniscient being on that account, -as is evident from the Jaina thinker *Prabhā-çandra*'s detailed criticism of the theory of "Omniscience in *Prakṛti*" in his *Pramēya-Kamala-Mārtanda*. Both the Sāṅkhya and the Yōga are, however, agreed that a freed soul is not omniscient. Notwithstanding their view about absence of omniscience in an emancipated soul, the Sāṅkhya thinkers nevertheless maintain that it is possible for a Yōgī (Sage) to know all things in some manner. "The effect is existent in the cause," says *Aṇiruddha Bhatta*, the commentator of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras, "What is found to perish (does not really perish absolutely but only) exists (once more) in the potential state in its basic ground. What is future (is not absolutely non-existent but only) exists in its cause as something not come yet. On account of their attainment of supernatural power of vision, the Yōgis come in contact with the *Pradhāna* (the ultimate potential and the efficient cause of all things) and through this contact, they come in contact with (the things of) all places and all times." In the same manner, the Yōga philosophers maintain that at the stage, penultimate to its liberation, the soul attains a consciousness which it

calls the Prātibha and through which it comes to know all things. Bhōja, the commentator of the Yōga Sūtras points out that “just as immediately before the sun-rise, a brilliant glow is visible in the sky, in the same manner, just before the rise of the Vivēka-khyāti or consciousness of emancipation, there arises the knowledge, called the Tāraka (otherwise called the Prātibha). Through this Tāraka-knowledge all things are known.”

It is next to be noted how according to the thinkers of the Advaita-Vēdānta school also, omniscience is not to be attributed to the soul which attains the final liberation. Śankara is definite that there being no reality other than the non-dual One, omniscience, if attributed to the pure consciousness (çit) of the absolute (Nirguṇa) Brahma, in the being of which an emancipated being merges itself becomes meaningless. Nevertheless, the Māyika Īśvara or the creator God whose reality is assumed by the absolute monists within the bounds of empirical experience is admitted to be omniscient and Śankara himself says that by worshipping this Saguṇa-Brahma, the worshipper attains his likeness and becomes possessed of such supernaturalities as “Sarvajñatva” or omniscience.

The systems of Indian thought which we have rapidly surveyed above are practically agreed that the power of knowing all things and phenomena is at least possible in some form in a being at a certain stage of its psychical development. The Mīmāṃsā school of thinkers are opposed to this view. The general contentions of the Mīmāṃsā thinkers may be arranged in two lines. Firstly,

they point out that there is no Pramāṇa (mode of valid knowledge), in support of the doctrine of omniscience and in the next place, they argue that omniscience is an impossibility.

Pratyakṣa is sensuous perception and arises only when its objects come in contact with the respective sense-organs. Objects lying outside the sense-contact, even those parts of a sense-object which are not in touch with a sense cannot thus be grasped by the Pratyakṣa. Besides, the objects of direct perception are generally gross ; the minute and the subtle, the past, the distant and the future are outside its ambit ; the Pratyakṣa cannot yield the ideas which are in other person's minds. The range of Pratyakṣa is thus limited. Anumāna or reasoning which is another source of valid knowledge is dependent on the correctness of its premises. We can infer about an omniscient being, only if the premises of the inference are invariably related to the fact of the reality of omniscience. But if, as just shown above, the Pratyakṣa cannot yield at all a direct knowledge of all things i. e., if all persons depending on Pratyakṣa are inomniscient, it follows that an omniscient being who is the very opposite of the inomniscient persons is nowhere to be found.

The next line of Mīmāṃsā argument against omniscience may be shortly indicated thus. The nature of the Pratyakṣa is such that it cannot coincide with omniscience. The inferential, the scriptural and other forms of knowledge are too vague and indistinct to enable one to be omniscient. A relevant question in this connection is : How does omniscience arise ? If it be held to arise

gradually, then a full and complete knowledge of all the things of the universe is certainly inattainable, in the short span of a human life. If, on the contrary, the knowledge of all things is to rise all at once, very serious difficulties stand in its way. How can the opposite perceptions, such as, of hot and cold, sweet and bitter, long and short etc. etc. arise simultaneously? In the next place, the omniscient being in the way of his being acquainted with the feelings of other persons, must himself be subject to those feelings. Lastly, how is the knowledge of an omniscient one about the past and the future dependable? The things of the past and the future are non-existent. If the omniscient be held to know the things of the past and of the future, he must know them as things present before him. A knowledge of a thing which is past or future, as a thing present, cannot however be said to be correct.

The Mīmāṃsā school of thinkers are for the reasons stated above, opposed to the possibility of omniscience.

The Jaina's are well known for their criticism of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine regarding omniscience. They admit that if by Pratyakṣa are meant the ordinary perceptions only, it cannot make the percipient omniscient. This indicates that in sensuous perception, power of omniscience is suppressed. Besides the sense perception, we have the internal or the Mānasa Pratyakṣa, in which sensations of pleasure or pain, *inter alia*, are felt. The internal perception like the sensuous does not make one omniscient but cannot be said to be

opposed to omniscience on that account. We have seen how in Yōgi-Pratyakṣa, the Ārṣa-jñāna, the Samūhālabhāna, the Prātibha etc. of the Vēdic school, the percipients have omniscience of some sort. The Jainas point out that besides the sensuous and the subjective perceptions, there are other modes of the Pratyakṣa. The Avadhi, for instance, is a supersensuous manner of perception, in which aspects of a gross object are perceived, which are not perceptible by the senses. Gross and minute things which are past, distant or future and which are imperceptible by the sense-organs are thus the objects of the Avadhi. It is said that the range of the Avadhi is increased in accordance with the extent to which the obstacles to it are removed and that in what is called the Sarvāvadhi, all the insensible aspects of all material objects of all times and of all places are perceived. In Manah-paryaya—the Jainas point out,—one comes to perceive the matters of other persons' minds. The scope of this telepathic knowledge also is evidenced in proportion to the removal of its obstacles. All these modes of the Pratyakṣa show that direct perception is not opposed to omniscience but rather leads to it by being clearer, richer and purer through the increasing subsidence of matters that suppress the potential faculty of omniscience in the soul. The Jaina's urge that the fact that we do not meet any omniscient person in our experience is no argument against the reality of omniscience. Many things lie outside the ambit of our experience but are nevertheless real, as every one will admit. When

one is fast asleep, he does not apprehend the objects of his waking experience ; but these objects are real inspite of the sleeping man's non-observation of them. The Jaina answer to the Mīmāṃsaka contention about the incapacity of the process of 'inference' to establish omniscience is that the contention is too formal to be of any assistance to it. If it is impossible to prove omniscience by inference without first acknowledging its reality, it is equally impossible to negative it by inference without first acknowledging its reality. The Jaina's call attention to some facts which go to show that the Arhats e.g. Vardhamāna and others, were really all-knowing persons. Shortly speaking, these premises for the reality of omniscience in the Arhat are that "his knowledge was not confined within a small number of things", that "he did not teach about only a limited number of objects," that "the hindrance to his knowledge did all totally subside". that "he was free from all attachment and envy", that "what he taught were not opposed to the Pramāṇas", that "his being a teacher and his being an omniscient being are not facts contradictory of each other", and similar other arguments. Anumāna is thus not opposed to the possibility of omniscience ; it rather proves that Vardhamāna and the other Arhats were really all-knowing persons. In the same manner the Āgama-pramāṇa or Scriptural Authority, far from going against the doctrine of omniscience, proves its reality in the Arhat, according to the Jaina's. To begin with, the Jaina's set aside the Mīmāṃsā contention about the Apauruṣēya or eternal self-existence of the

Vēdic or any Scripture and maintain that all Scriptures must have their appropriate authors. The Āgama is thus man-made. If then the Āgama is man-made, who can be its author, if it is authoritative, faultless and perfectly pure (as the Jaina's claim their Āgama to be)? He must be all-knowing, otherwise his teachings would be unreliable. The Āgama-pramāṇa thus proves the reality of omniscience in the Arhat who is the author of the perfectly faultless Scripture. The Pratyakṣa, the Anumāna and the Āgama, instead of disproving the possibility of Omniscience prove thus its reality in the Arhat and hence the Mīmāṃsā arguments, further based on Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Abhāva are necessarily weak.

In considering the Jaina criticism of the second line of the Mīmāṃsā argument against the possibility of omniscience, two things, to which we have already referred must be borne in mind. These are firstly that "hindrance to the Arhat's knowledge did all totally subside" and that "he was free from all attachment and envy." These two features in the nature of the Arhat make it such as to reflect, as it were, all things with their infinite modes and phenomena in it. He is a perfectly unattached conscious being, in whom, the knowledge of all things, arises automatically. He takes no interest in any of those things; yet, because he is a conscious person and all hindrances to complete knowledge have been removed from his consciousness, he knows all things. Things may have temporal, spatial and other quantitative or qualitative differences among themselves but these

differences cannot prevent their knowledge from arising in the consciousness of the Arhat, simultaneously. He knows those things with all their differences and modifications. Contradictions in the natures of those things may and do isolate them from each other but cannot prevent their simultaneous presentation to the Arhat, as he is perfectly unattached and indifferent to them. He knows the minds of all beings with all their feelings of joy and sorrow, as all obstacles to his omniscience have subsided but he is not affected by those feelings because he is thoroughly unattached. Barriers of time and space which separate things and phenomena from one another no doubt present themselves as such in the consciousness of the Arhat but cannot stop the knowledge of those things and phenomena from arising simultaneously in his omniscience. By nature, then, the Arhat is omniscient.

In this connection one is to note a point upon which the Digamvara and the Śwētāmvara schools of the Jainas are sharply divided. Both the schools agree that omniscience is possible and that the Arhat, the God, embodied in a human body, is omniscient. But while the Digamvara's maintain that this God-in-man does not take any food, the Śwētāmvara's contend that the omniscient Lord, until he enters into the completely disembodied state, continues to take food. Prabhāçandra, the author of the *Pramēya-Kamala-Mārtanda*, supports the former view in the following manner. People take food only when they suffer from hunger, which, unless and until it is appeased, gives pain to them.

If then, we suppose the Arhat to take food, we must hold that he is at times under some pain due to hunger. The Arhat is admittedly possessed of infinite happiness and to attribute a feeling of pain to him is to deny the infiniteness of his joy. It cannot be said that the eating of food gives us pleasure so that if the Arhat be supposed to take food, this only conduces to his pleasure. For, the pleasure which we get from eating food is strictly temporary and cannot be assimilated to the joy of the Arhat which is unbounded. The Digamvaras point out that the Arhat is *Vītarāga* i. e. absolutely free from all feelings of attachment and that if an inclination to take food is attributed to him it would be denying his *Vītarāga* character. It cannot be said that even the most passionless of saints and sages are found to eat, which shows that taking of food has nothing to do with one's passionless character; for, the passionlessness in the Arhat is absolute and cannot be compared with the passionlessness of a saint or sage, which with all its greatness is but limited. Eating again, is prompted by recollection and a desire (regarding the nature of the food) and if the Arhat is supposed to eat, he must be held to be subjected to the feelings of recollection and desire (regarding the nature of the food) which are opposed to his *Vītarāga* character. It is contended that eating is a miraculous power in the Arhat, in as much as it is not attended with any previous recollection or desire in him. But why attribute this miraculous power to him? Why not be content with endowing the Arhat with the miraculous power of living

without any food ? It is said that for the preservation of the body, the Arhat must eat,—to which the Digamvara answer is that if the heavenly beings can preserve their bodies without taking any food (which is an admitted fact), there is no reason why in the case of the Arhat, food must be necessary for the preservation of his body. It is true that the body of the heavenly beings is different from the body of the Arhat, which is after all gross (Audārika). But the body of the Arhat being admittedly Parama-Audārika or super-fine, it requires no food for its preservation. The Digamvara's point out that hunger is due to the influx of the Mōhaniya Karma into one's soul and that as the Arhat is devoid of the Mōhaniya Karma, he cannot have hunger which prompts one to take food. It cannot be contended that hunger is a mere feeling-Vēdaniya, and that as Vēdaniya Karmas still attach to the Arhat in spite of his Arhat-hood, there is no contradiction if the Arhat has the feeling of hunger,—a pure Vēdaniya,—and takes food. The Digamvara's point out that hunger cannot be regarded as a pure feeling or Vēdaniya, because it makes one appropriate food and destroy the unpleasantness of itself. It can well be compared with Riraṃsā or sexual impulse which makes one get a woman and remove the sexual urge by enjoying her. Riraṃsā is a Mōhaniya Karma and like it, the feeling of hunger also is a Mōhaniya Karma and not a passive Vēdaniya. Presence of hunger is opposed to the presence of infinite happiness in the Arhat. In the next place, how does the Arhat eat ? Does he eat while teaching

in the Assembly, (Samavaśaraṇa and in a state of hunger ? In that case, the purity of his conduct is destroyed. Suppose again, while teaching in the Assembly, he becomes hungry and does not get his food. Afflicted with hunger, his teaching cannot be expected to be correct. It is said that the Arhat when hungry cannot be in want of food ; for, gods are there always ready with it. The Digamvaras urge that there is no Pramāṇa, no evidence, that is to say, that the gods supply food to the Arhat, in his Assembly. If the Arhat does not eat in the Assembly, how does he get the food ? Does he beg the food from door to door ? In that case, the Arhat appears clearly as an ignorant (i. e. inomniscient) person who does not know at the outset, at which house exactly, he is to get his food. Or does he go to one house only, knowing that this house would give him the necessary food ? In that case, the food that he gets from that one house as alms, would not be pure, according to the injunctions of the Jaina moral law. The very fact that the Arhat goes out for food, makes his eating impossible. For, on his way he must meet with innocent animals, being killed or injured by bad persons, with flesh of slaughtered animals and other impure objects and after these experiences, how can he eat ? If he be supposed to take his food even after these sights, he must be held to be unkind and unsympathetic, which is against the Jaina conception about him. Then again, according to the Jainas, eating itself is a sin, for various reasons and a pious person is asked to expiate it, after it. Does

the Arhat expiate the sin then, after eating ? If he does, then it shows that sin can touch him, which goes against the doctrine of the absolute incorruptibility of the Arhat. If he does not, the sin continues to be attached to him, which view also cannot be entertained. The last question in connection with Arhat's eating is : Why should the Arhat eat ? It has already been shown that as a perfect being, the Arhat is free from hunger and as such, he has no necessity for taking food. His attainments (Lābha) are infinite, so that he is under no necessity for eating, in order that he can make his body fitter and stronger. He is possessed of infinite knowledge etc. and cannot require food for enabling the body to acquire wisdom or to keep it under restraint or to make it fit for contemplative purposes. It is impossible for any form of sudden death to approach him so that he cannot be said to take meals for saving his life. For all these reasons, the Digamvara section of the Jainas maintain that the Arhat does not take any food.

The Śwētāmvara school of the Jainas contend on the contrary, that the Arhat eats food and that his eating food does not go against his omniscience in any way. Ratna-prabha, the commentator of the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālōkālamkāra describes the position of the Śwētāmvaras in this matter in the following way. In the Arhat, all the Antarāya or obstructive Karmas i. e. forces that obstruct his natural powers are annihilated, so that there is nothing which can stop his activities. Accordingly, it cannot be argued that the Omniscient Arhat is

prevented from getting his food or that he is unable to eat it even when he gets it or that although he is able to eat it, he does not eat it lest "the pure light of Omniscience flies away". It should also be noticed in this connection that eating is not a phenomena which is **essentially** opposed to all forms of knowledge. For, eating consists in throwing some food in the stomach : does this phenomena of throwing food in the stomach interfere in any way with any form of knowledge ? If not, then eating cannot be said to be opposed to Omniscience. Coming to the **causes** or **conditions**, of eating, we find that these are either the food or the food-pot which holds the food or the body which is the consumer of the food. The experience of all of us who are eaters of food is that food has got nothing to do with the nature or the extent of our knowledge. The pot containing the food is similarly unconnected with the knowing faculty or capacity of the person who eats from the pot. In the case of the Arhat again, the question does not arise at all ; for, he does not use any pot but holds the food and eats it from the palms of his own hands. As regards body as a condition of eating, it cannot oppose the Omniscience of the Arhat ; because although he has a body, he has no feeling of attachment to it. As regards the internal conditions for eating, they are either a subtle body or Karma i. e. physiological force. It is a 'subtle body' called the Taijasa Śarīra which is supposed to underlie the operation of eating (Bhukti-hētu). That this Taijasa-Śarīra is not opposed to the omniscience of the Lord is

evidenced by the fact that this body continues to exist in a being even when he has obtained omniscience. Karma again which in the case under consideration is the organic or physiological propensity, is admittedly another 'internal cause' or 'condition' of eating. Hunger precedes eating and the question arises under which category of the Karma, the Omniscient's hunger is to be brought. It is said that hunger is a form of 'stupefaction', implying an imperfection in the person who is hungry. It is the Mōhaniya Karma which stupefies a person and accordingly, hunger comes to be classified under the Mōhaniya. It may be conceded that hunger in us may be a mode of the Mōhaniya but this does not show that the Omniscient's hunger also is such. Hunger in the Arhat is a perfectly involuntary phenomena; it does not arise in him, as a form of defect or imperfection in him. It is an admitted fact that acts of the Omniscient being e. g. his staying, moving, speaking, teaching, walking etc.—are all strictly involuntary and absolutely free, even though those acts of his are attended with their usual means and all antecedent, consequent and accompanying bodily phenomena. Hunger is an involuntary impulse in the Arhat in the same manner and not a voluntary urge for a delicious food. In other words, it is not a stupefying Mōhaniya force in him but simply a bare feeling, a Karma, no doubt, but of the Vēdaniya form. Besides the Vēdaniya Karma in the form of an involuntary feeling of hunger, the Āhāra-Paryāpti which consists in a capacity to take in molecules

competent to build up a body, is also an internal condition for taking food. But these two joint internal causes of eating, the Vēdaniya and the Āhāra-Paryāpti, are not opposed to omniscience, in as much as the presence and the functionings of the Vēdaniya and the Āhāra-Paryāpti in the Arhat are admitted even by the non-Śwētāmvara school. The external or internal causes or condition, of eating are thus not opposed to omniscience. Nor does the Kārya or the effect of eating oppose omniscience. Eating generates a sensation of taste but this is so far as we the inomniscient persons are concerned. In the Arhat, eating does not give rise to any sensation of taste. Nor can eating disturb the contemplation of the Arhat. Acts like eating have nothing to do with one's contemplation. This is evidenced by the fact that for a considerable time before he attained omniscience, the Arhat had abstained from taking food but that inspite of this fact of non-eating, he had not the pure contemplation during that period. Then, when he attains omniscience, he has the pure contemplation which is endless and can never be disturbed on any account. For instance, when he has attained omniscience, he walks, comes, goes and talks but these never disturb his contemplation. It may be said that in the very same manner, the Arhat's contemplation is never disturbed by the act of his taking meals. Nor can it be contended that eating would be an obstacle to the Arhat's practice of doing good to others. The Omniscient being finishes his eating within a very short time in the third quarter of the day ; for the remaining

portion of the day, he remains completely free for practising his acts of charity. The omniscient's meals being pure and moderate in quantity, no bad effects can follow from his eating. The Arhat is characterised by his absolute carefulness in walking and all his acts ; he is possessed of absolute power, vision and knowledge, so that the carefulness in all his acts is never modified by his eating. The stupefying influence of the Mōhaniya Karma having left the Arhat completely eating can not produce in him the tendencies to sleep, Riraṃsā or sexual impulses and such other bad effects. Finally, it may be pointed out that the Arhat's eating is not followed by any of the dirty phenomena in his body as is the case with the ordinary animal frames. No act, deed, posture or phenomena connected with the omniscient's body can ever appear as unclean or objectionable. This is evidenced by the prominent fact that he sits in the Assembly of gods, men, devils and their ladies in a completely naked state but that to none of them, this nakedness of the omniscient Arhat has ever appeared as undesirable. Thus the Śwētāmvara doctrine is that, considered from all the possible view-points viz. regarding the nature, the causes and the effects of eating, it is clear that eating is in no way opposed to the Arhat's omniscience.

We do not feel ourselves called upon to decide the dispute between the above two contending views. We are not unmindful of the fact that the non-Jainas in general are not much interested in the arguments of the Jaina sectional schools and we would have refrained from setting forth the

points of those disputations but for the fact that the doctrines hint at a point which is of some importance. It would appear from the respective contentions of the two schools of the Jainas that the dispute between them centres round the question of the nature of Hunger. Hunger or the impulse for taking food is a Mōhaniya Karma, involving volition in some form, according to the Digamvaras while according to the Śwētāmvaras it is a Vēdaniya, an involuntary or a purely organic urge. It would be seen that this question has reappeared in our days in a more comprehensive form viz: the question about the nature of Instincts in general. Some biologists identify instinctive acts with purely reflex actions. But this is going too far. In reflex actions, consciousness is almost absent and where present, it is very low in the scale. Instinctive actions, on the contrary, are always permeated by a clear consciousness. The origin of instincts is sought for in the gradual accumulation of adjustments to environments in the remote ancestors of a species, which adjustments reappear in the descendants as fixed and spontaneous habits. According to Darwin and the natural evolutionists, an act accidentally useful is selected and preserved by nature and handed down to the descendants as an organic urge. Spencer, on the contrary, holds that the individuals in the remote ancestry of a present species were compelled to preserve themselves by making various adjustments to their environments, which adjustments became gradually fixed habits and were inherited by the offspring as instincts.

Whatever may be the origin of an instinct, accidental variation or conscious adaptation to environments, both the Darwinian and the Spencerian schools are agreed that the instinctive impulses in a being, as we have them at present are fixed organic habits or urges involving no cogitative or voluntary act. We venture to maintain that this view is practically implied in the Śwētāmvara theory that the instinct of hunger is a pure Vēdaniya or impulse and not the effect of the Mōhaniya Karma or the consciously voluntary act. Some biologists, on the other hand, are opposed to the above view of an instinct as a secondary automatic impulse and point out that an instinctive act is never completely unconscious or purely mechanical. It has been found that even the instinctive nature of a reaction of an animal is changed with the change of stimuli or circumstances. This shows that intelligence is operative in such cases and that for the matter of that, all instinctive acts are attended with what Piere Huber calls "a little dose of judgment or reason." It appears that this view of an instinctive act being always attended with some amount of judgment and reason is on a line with the Digamvara doctrine that an instinct like hunger is a Mōhaniya or an intelligent act and not Vēdaniya i. e. an automatic impulse.

Another point to which a reference may be made here in connection with the Jaina controversy about Arhat's eating is this : Admittedly the Arhat has on the one hand a physical body and is on the other endowed with the divine attribute of omniscience and the question arises as to the

manner of the former's subsistence. To both the schools of the Jainas, the physical body does not affect in any way the psychical attainment of omniscience of the Arhat. Yet while the Digamvaras maintain that the physical part of the Arhat does not require any materials for its up-keep, the Śwētāmvaras hold that the Arhat's body should be supplied with the minimum of what are necessary for its maintenance and continuance for the required period. The question of the physical and the psychical in the omniscient is cursorily raised in some of the non-Jaina systems of the Indian philosophy also, but there it is not considered in details as has been done in the Jaina. Thus the Sāṅkhya points out that a Jīvanmukta i. e. one who is liberated-while-in-body "carries the body just as a wheel has motion for some time (even after the moving agent withdraws itself from it)." The Sāṅkhya does not specifically state whether the body thus attached to the liberated one has any natural needs and that these are to be fulfilled. The fundamental position of the Vēdic school is that "without the fruits of acts being experienced, the effects of acts do not cease (Nābhuktam Kṣīyate Karma)." One's body is the effect of his previous acts and this effect continues until the natural results of those acts are fully enjoyed. It follows that even if one be possessed of perfect knowledge, his body would continue so long as he does not finish the experience of all his previous actions for which the embodiment was necessary. Some of the religious thinkers of the Vēdic school accordingly hold that in order to accelerate the

attainment of the disembodied liberation, one on the way to it evolves several bodies (Kāya-vyūha) from within himself all at once, in order that the fruits of his previous acts may be experienced in full in the shortest possible time. The well-known theory is that right knowledge (Tattvajñāna) destroys wrong knowledge. The Nyāya thinkers explain this theory as meaning that the psychical continuum effected by right knowledge ultimately destroys the existing continuum, effected by wrong knowledge, by preventing the further growth of Rāga (feeling of attachment) and Dvēṣa (feeling of envy). A man having the Tattvajñāna may thus have his body for sometime but as he has no Rāga or Dvēṣa, the psychical continuum produced by wrong knowledge is ultimately destroyed in him and he attains the disembodied liberation. The Nyāya philosophers thus admit that a Jīvanmukta has a body for sometime but by-pass the question whether the body has any natural needs of its own and that these are to be satisfied. The Vēdānta philosophy similarly affirms that the Tattva-jñāna annihilates Avidyā. The destruction of Avidyā is not a sudden affair. Roughly speaking, Avidyā grows and thrives on acts done by a being and his body would continue so long as the fruits of these are not fully experienced. The Tattva-jñāna prevents any future acts being done. It also prevents the potential effects of the acts already done (Anārabdha) from being actual but it cannot stop the experience of the effects of acts which are already active (Prārabdha). This is technically expressed by the author of the Ratna-

prabhā by saying that the Tattva-jñāna destroys the Āvaraṇa-Śakti (power of enveloping the soul) of the Avidyā but cannot stop its Vikṣēpa-Śakti (already active psychical tendency), which must have its full course of its functioning. The result is that a Jīvanmukta although he has the Tattva-jñāna and has the enveloping power of Avidyā destroyed in him, continues to have a body in order that the Lēśa or the last trace of the Vikṣēpa-Śakti of the Avidyā may be exhausted in him by its full play. With all this however, the Vēdānta does not seriously consider whether the body of the Jīvanmukta has any natural requirements which are ministered to by him, so long as he continues to be encased in it.

In Christianity, Christ occupies almost the same position as the Arhat in the Jaina religion. But omniscience was not specifically attributed to Jesus and therefore the question of the juxtaposition of bodily needs and omniscience does not arise in Christianity, in the same form as in the various systems of Indian thought. Still, Jesus had a human nature on the one hand and a divine character on the other and this dualism in Jesus gave rise to various speculations. Ebionism was exclusively humanitarian and denied the divinity of Jesus as a real fact. The gnostic heresy on the other hand looked upon the human element in Christ as nothing more than a phantasm. According to the gnostics, the incarnation of Jesus was more a metaphor than a fact. These heretics were otherwise known as the Docetists and they held that Jesus did not really take a human body but

only seemed to take it. Ebionism consisted in the evaporation of the divine element in Jesus. Docetism denied the reality of his human part. These two extreme and mutually contradictory views were propounded probably to guard against the difficulty arising from the fact of repugnance between the physical and the spiritual aspects of the personality of the Messiah. Eutyches recognised this repugnance and attempted to solve the problem by obliterating the distinction as much as possible. The human nature is defied by the Eutychianists and is absorbed by them into the divine. The former is conceived by them to be submerged or completely transformed by the latter. In opposition to these one-sided heresies, the Arian school recognised the real presence of both a human and a divine nature in Jesus. Apollinarius, the Younger, who was a bishop of Laodicea contended that two natures, one altogether divine and the other altogether human, could not co-exist in the Christ. According to him, the human element in Jesus consisted in a body and an animal or irrational soul. But although Jesus was thus possessed of a human body, he had no rational soul of his own. The so-called divine nature in him was only the Logos or the universal Reason. What was promulgated by Apollinarius amounted to this that the two elements, the human and the divine were not really unified in Jesus but that he was only a man who was inspired by God. The Nestorians on the other hand placed the two natures in external juxtaposition, side by side, and declared that the divine and the human

elements in Jesus were without any vital intercommunion. The Council of Chalcedon set aside all these heretical views and avowed, "We all with one voice confess our Lord Jesus Christ one and the same son.....the same consisting of reasonable Soul and a Body," but at the same time admitted him "to be acknowledged of two natures.....,the distinction of natures being in no wise done away because of the union but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved and concurring into one person"... "Later on, the Monophysitic heresy in the Eastern Church tended again towards Eutychianism and held that Christ had but one nature in which the human element was a "contingent" quality of the divine. The Monothelites shifted the controversy to the psychological ground and they contended that as Christ was one person, he could not be said to have two co-operating wills—a human and a divine,—as held by the Church but had but one will. The Third Council of Constantinople re-iterated the doctrine of Chalcedon but had to add a supplementary article, "preaching two natural wills and two natural prenomena. "It may be noted that even the Reformed Churches tended to a separation of the two natures in Jesus, although the Lutheran Christology emphasised his divine nature rather than the human. The problem of the two natures was revived in the famous Kenosis and Kryptsis controversy in the 17th Century. The leaders of the controversy agreed that Christ had two natures in him and while the Krypties held that Jesus used his divine powers secretly, the

Kenotists urged that he abstained from exercising them. The tendency of the modern Christologists has been to do away with the barrier between the divine and the human elements by showing that the latter are only the potentiality of the former, that, in other words, divinity is the humanity in its consummated form. Roughly speaking, it may be said that the Christological controversies are based on the apparent fact of a dual nature in Jesus but are not content with having the two natures separated. The Indian schools (and perhaps the Nestorians) frankly acknowledged the absolute repugnance between the divine and the human elements in the being of the liberated but the Christologists wanted to do away with the dualism either by subordinating the one to the latter or by harmonising them, if possible or by obliterating one of them completely.

The last but not the least feature in the character of the Arhat is that he is the 'Āpta'.. The Āpta is a person whose words are the words of authority. In our ordinary life, we have in parents, teachers and experienced people, instances of an Āpta, because what they say carry weight with us and we are profited by their instructions. These persons are the Laukika Āptas or teachers so far as our ordinary walks of life are concerned. In the Arhat, however, we have the Lōkōttara Āpta or the supreme or the super-human teacher. The Arhat reveals the ultimate truths and shows the unmistakable way to the final liberation. He is omniscient and is accordingly the only competent person to present things in their true light. He is

the infallible authority and his teachings give us truths and nothing but truths. 'The Arhat's teachings are explained by competent masters; these are accordingly Lōkōttara Āptas in a secondary sense.

The orthodox thinkers of the Vēdic Śrōtriya school, however, look upon the Vēdic scripture as the true Āpta. The Vēdas according to them incorporate in them, the ultimate truths and are the only competent authorities to lay down rules for our guidance and of our conduct. The Vēdas are Apauruṣēya, i. e. they had no authors and as such they are eternal and self-existent. No one, be he good or bad—can be the author of the Vēdas. Every book which is the product of man is bound to be influenced by the nature of its author and accordingly no book can be absolutely authoritative. The Śrōtriyas point out that we come across expressions like 'reading the Vēdas', 'remembering the Vēdas' and so on but never with any statement about "composing" or 'making the Vēdas'. This is because the Vēdas are eternally self-existent and had at no time their author. There is the unbroken line of Vēdic scholars stretching back to the remotest past but none could remember any author of the Vēdas. They are eternally self-existent; they are not destroyed with the destruction of the world, nor are they composed at the beginning of any Kalpa or periodic evolution of the world. They continue to exist at all times,—being only "seen" sometimes and sometimes being "not seen".

The Jainas do not believe in the authoritative

character of the Śrōtriyas' Vēdas. They contend that these Vēdas cannot be said to be eternally self-existent. "The fact of non-remembrance of any author" ('Karturasmaranāt') of the Vēdas does not prove that they had not any author at any time. In the case of an ancient well, an ancient house or an ancient garden people may not know who in olden times made it, the name of its maker may long have been forgotten, but nobody would be prepared to say that the well or the house or the garden is self-existent from the eternal past. The Śrōtriya doctrine of the eternal self-existence of the Vēdas is thus untenable. In this connection, it may be mentioned that the thinkers of the Sāṅkhya school also oppose the doctrine of the self-existence of the Vēdas. According to them, besides the Prakṛti or the ultimate material principle and the infinite number of Puruṣas or souls there is no other real which is eternal and self-existent. The Vēdas are natural evolutes in due course from the cosmic Prakṛti.

But although the Sāṅkhya philosophers do not accept the Śrōtriya contention about the self-existence of the Vēdas they agree with them that the Vēdas are Apauruṣēya or not-man-made. The author of the Sāṅkhya-Sūtras says, "The Vedas can not be said to have been made by man, because there cannot be any human author for them," "Both a liberated and an unliberated persons are equally incompetent for the composition of the Vēdas." The Jaina philosophers criticise also the doctrine of the Apauruṣēya character of the Vēdas.

They urge that if the Vēdas are held to be made neither by a wise nor by an unwise man, then they would be nothing better than a collection of meaningless jargons. The Jainas point out that it is in the Vēdas themselves, the authority of which is not challenged by the Śrōtriyas that we meet with expressions which point to the fact of their having been made,—such as “one who makes the Vēdas”, “Prajāpati made the King Sōma and from him were made the three Vēdas.” Besides, we find that to the various parts of the Vēdas are attached the names of some sages e. g. Kanva, Mādhyandina, Tittirī etc. This shows that these sages were the authors of those parts. The Śrōtriyas, as we have seen, contend that the parts of the Vēdas bear the names of some sages, not because those sages were the actual authors of those parts, but because those parts were first revealed to or re-published by them at the beginning of the present age. The Jainas set aside this contention of the Śrōtriyas by urging that time is beginningless so that if a part of the Vēdas were revealed at the beginning of each Kalpa to a particular sage whose name is borne by that part, then each such part would have borne the names of an infinite number of such sages to whom it was revealed in the infinite number of the past Kalpas. The Jainas, however, have their own theory about the authorship of the Vēdas viz, that it was a devil, Kālāsura by name, who composed the Vēdas.

The Jainas further point out that the very fact that the Vēdas are a collection of words, so arranged as to carry an intelligible sense, shows that they

were carefully made. The author of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* endorses this view of the Jainas and urges that “the arrangement of words in the *Vēdas* betrays intelligence at work”; from this fact the thinkers of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* schools conclude that the *Vēdas* are not *Apauruṣēya*, as the *Śrōtriya*s contend but that they are the compositions of an intelligent being.

With all their mutual differences, all the orthodox schools of thinkers are agreed that the *Vēdas* are absolutely infallible authorities. Their authoritative character, according to the *Mīmāṃsā Śrōtriya* school as well as the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Yōga* philosophers is due to the fact that no being, either good or bad, can be credited with the capacity for knowing eternal truths and laying down absolutely correct lines of duty. The *Nyāya*, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Vēdānta* thinkers attribute the infallible characters of the *Vēdas* to the fact of their being the emanations from the *Īśvara*, the omniscient being. The Jaina philosophers, as we have already seen, reject the hypothesis of a cosmic creator, so that they cannot accept the doctrine of the *Vēdas*, or for the matter of that, of any *Āgama*, -being the composition of a world-architect. They admit that there is such a thing as an infallible *Āgama* or a body of supremely authoritative teachings but they contend that the *Vēdas* of the *Śrōtriya* school is not such an *Āgama*. In this connection, reference may be made to the *Arthāpatti* (Necessary Implication) line of argument advanced by the *Śrōtriya* thinkers. According to them, the *Vēdas* are faultless and free from mistakes

and as nothing made by man can be absolutely true and faultless, the Vēdas must be held to be 'not-man-made'. The Jainas point out that even if we do not go so far as to hold with the Çarvākas that "the authors of the three Vēdas were respectively hypocrites (Bhaṇdas), cheats (Dhūrtas) and monsters (Niśāçaras)", the fact cannot be denied that often-times the acts enjoined by the Vēdas do not produce their prescribed results. Moreover, the instructions and injunctions, contained in the Vēdic texts are vicious owing to their insistence on the killing of innocent animals. The Vēdic sayings are thus not only untrue but full of faults and must have emanated from persons who are inomniscient and to a certain extent immoral. The Śrōtriya-Vēdas are not accordingly the safe and infalliable Āgama.

It follows that a true Āgama must always contain an exact representation of truths as they are and be absolutely free from all kinds of blemishes and taints of immorality. Such an Āgama is possible only if it comes from a person who is omniscient. And not only that. In order that the Āgama may be perfectly reliable, it should consist in the pronouncements of a person who not only knows the nature of all things, of all times, with all their phenomenal modifications but that that person must teach the objects of his knowledge, faithfully. For, instances are not rare in which a person may know a matter truly but for various reasons, expresses it otherwise ; such a person cannot be the author of a true Āgama. The Jainas claim that their Āgama or the "Jaina

Vēda", as they call it, acquaints us with complete truths about things and is perfectly free from all blemishes. The reason is not that it is self-existent from the beginningless past nor that it is a creation of God or evolute from the ultimate principle but that it emanates from a being who through his self-culture and self-development extending over a series of existences, realised his self and saw the truths as they are. His self-perfection removed from him all taints of faults, selfishness and drawbacks and endowed him with a nature of unbounded kindness for the suffering creatures. Questions have arisen as to how a perfect being like the Arhat who is thoroughly unattached to the affairs of the world can feel for the humanity, teach them truths and true rules of conduct. The answer is that the Arhat, omniscient as he is, is still encased in a body and that the Vēdanīya which accounts for his just and automatic feelings of joy and sorrow, is still with him. As an embodied being he is still related to all embodied beings and although the feelings which arise from selfishness and selfish attachment to mundane affairs have left him, there is still the existence of the vanishing Vēdanīya in him so that "calm pleasures there abide, majestic pains." It is no wonder that owing to purely unselfish feelings the Ārhat shows to the sufferers the way to the final bliss and faithfully imparts to his hearers the truths which he has seen and realised. The Arhat is thus the true teacher and his teachings from the true Āgama.

Mere authoritativeness of a teaching or command cannot long sustain a hold over people's

minds. In spite of their doctrine that the Āpta should be unquestioningly believed in and followed, the orthodox thinkers of the Vēdic school felt the necessity of defending the Vēdic injunctions on other grounds in addition to their being authoritative. They held that the religious duties enjoined by the Vēdas have an efficacy. But difficulties arise in this connection. For, some of the Vēdic injunctions appear to have no efficacy at all as far as our mundane life is concerned. The Vēdic thinkers try to avoid the difficulty by saying that although these injunctions yield us no good in this life of ours, they would bear good fruits in our after-life existences. But where is the guarantee for the truth of this assertion? The orthodox Vēdic thinkers urge that since those Vēdic injunctions which promise good to the observers in their present life are found to be true we can safely say that the other injunctions relating to the supra-mundane good are also true. It is unfortunately a blunt fact,—too well-known to be denied,—that often-times the ritualistic acts enjoined by the Vēdas for securing some good in the present life of a man, do not prove to be of the efficacy, as alleged. To contend—as done by the Śrōtriyas, that these Vēdic acts become unproductive of the prescribed results because of some deviations consciously or unconsciously made in the manner of doing them, is after all but a poor defence. To carry convictions, a matter must be clear and free from doubts. The Jainas say that their Āgama is such. It is not only the utterance of the Omniscient and the absolutely pure Arhat but it stands the severest

of all logical tests. Take, for instance, the Syād-Vāda, the basal principle of the Jaina speculative philosophy and the doctrine of Ahimsā, the cornerstone of the Jaina ethical edifice,—the two fundamental theories, propounded by the Arhat. Examine the two doctrines from any standpoints,—scientific, psychological, social or political,—their truth will appear to be convincing and unquestionable on all occasions.

THE SIDDHA.

The Siddha indicates one who is finally liberated. The Jainas maintain that save and except those unfortunate beings who are called the Abhavyas, all conscious creatures have the capacity to attain Siddha-hood. The Siddha of the Jainas is to be distinguished from persons who through mystic processes acquire supernatural powers and are also popularly called the Siddhas. The noticeable difference which lies between an Arhat and a Siddha is that while neither of them is attached to the affairs of the world, the former is encased in a body and teaches all beings who are seekers of truth, the latter is disembodied and is untouched by any material things or phenomena of the universe. The Arhat, otherwise known as the Tirthamkara on account of his showing the way to liberation, enters the state of Siddha-hood or disembodied emancipation after the completion of his earthly mission.

Both in the Arhat and in the Siddha, the unpsychical forces, which envelope their natural powers of perception and knowledge, which delude their spirituality and which obstruct their natural powers of attainments,—the Jñānāvaraṇa, the Darśanāvaraṇa, the Mōhanīya and the Antarāya Karmas, as they are called,—are annihilated, as a result of which, the Arhat and the Siddha attain liberation, characterised by the four infinities of perception, cognition, bliss and power. Besides the above-mentioned four Karmic forces which suppress the essential attributes of a soul and are called the Ghāti Karmas, there are four other forms of Karma-matter which also attach to the soul and on account of their having lesser powers of doing mischief are called the Aghāti Karmas. These are respectively,—1. The Āyu, which determines the span of a being's empirical existence, 2. The Nāma, which gives a being his particular structure etc. 3. The Gōtra, which accounts for a being's birth in a high or a low family and 4. The Vēdanīya, which brings about feelings of pleasure and pain. The Arhat, though he has attained omniscience and liberation, continues to be connected with these four forms of the Aghāti Karma forces and consequently encased in a suitable body of noble birth and high parentage and goes on teaching the suffering creatures, out of boundless compassion for them, for some period, till he enters the disembodied state of Siddha-hood. The Siddha, on the contrary, is completely free from the influences of all the eight kinds of Karma,—Ghāti and Aghāti,—

and is called the Nik-kamma i. e. devoid of all Karma-influences.

It is thus clear that the Jaina theory about the state of final liberation (Mukti) ascribes to the liberated being some attributes or inseparable features and as such is sharply opposed to the theories of the other schools. The Buddhist theory, although it describes the liberated state as a state of eternal bliss, cuts away the very foundation of all liberation and of liberated beings when it says that no reality is attached to them. If the liberated being does not exist as a real persisting being, it is meaningless to call his liberation a blissful state. According to the Vēdānta, again, no attribute or mode is real, it is the unmodified and non-dual substance that alone is real. The so-called liberated being, far from being looked upon as an existent, a conscious and a blissful being, is to be understood as 'existence' (sat), 'consciousness' (çit) and 'bliss' (ānanda) itself. The matter is not much improved in the Sāṅkhya. For, although the Sāṅkhya calls a liberated being, a "pure" (Śuddha) an 'emancipated' (Mukta) and a 'conscious' (Buddha) real, it holds that an attribute attaches only to a material reality and can have no application to the Puruṣa or the conscious substance. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, we come across almost the same doctrine. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school no doubt maintain that consciousness, joy, power etc. are real attributes, -nine in number, -ascribed to a Jiva or a conscious soul but so far as the emancipation of the Jiva is concerned it is said to consist in Nava-guṇōçhēda or a

complete eradication from it, of all those nine attributes, including consciousness itself. A finally emancipated being, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is a pure being, a rigidly abstract substance, a bare existence, not even conscious. The Jaina theory of liberation is opposed to all these theories. As regards the Buddhist theory, it is sufficient for its rejection, to point out that if everything, - substance, attribute, their relation, all phenomena, is *ūnreal*, then the Buddhist contention itself becomes baseless and unsubstantial too. The other theories of emancipation are really founded upon theories of substance on the one hand and of attributes, on the other. According to the Jaina theory, a substance and an attribute are essentially related - so much so that neither can be real without the other. The pure existence in which a liberated being is said to consist, according to the Nyāya school, is impossible unless we mean by it, a being (the substance) which is existent (i. e. invested with the attribute of existence). In the same manner, the pure bliss and the pure intelligence in the state of liberation, as conceived by the Vēdānta and the Sāṅkhya schools, are possible, - as the Jainas maintain, - only if a liberated being is held to be possessed of the attributes of consciousness and joy. Neither is a liberated being (as a substance) possible without his having the attributes of bliss and knowledge etc. (as according to the Naiyāyikas) nor are bliss, consciousness and existence possible (as according to the Sāṅkhya and the Vēdānta) without their being the essential features of a liberated being. A substance is

impossible without its attributes and an attribute is impossible without its abode, the substance. The liberated soul being thus a real with attributes ascribed to it, the Jainas point out that these attributes may be considered in various ways. Attributes are either general or special. General attributes in a liberated being are those which he possesses in common with all other real substances. These are 'existence' (astitva) 'reality' (vastutva), 'knowability' (pramēyatva) and similar others. The four cardinal attributes of 'omniscience', 'infinite apprehension,' 'boundless joy' and 'unlimited power,'—the four infinities, already noticed, are of course possessed by the Siddha in common with the Arhat. Besides these, the specific features which are attributable to a Siddha are the attributes of 'not belonging to any species' (nirgatitva), of 'having no sense-organs' (nirindriyatva), of 'having no body' (niskāyatva), of 'not being subjected to any outside vibrations' (niryōgatva), of 'not being subjected to affective feelings' (nirvēdatva), of 'not being subject to any emotion' (niṣkaṣāyatva), of 'having no name' (nirṇāmatva), of 'having no lineage' (nirgōtratva) of 'having no limited span of life' (nirāyuṣatva) etc. etc. It should be noted in this connection that the number of features, attributed to the Siddha depends on the manner of viewing them. A person, interested in identifying (Abhēda-naya) the varied attributes as much as possible, from his peculiar view-point, would sometimes find e.g. only four features viz. the four Infinities, sometimes, three of them, sometimes two and

sometimes only one viz. the attribute of pure consciousness in the Siddha. Such a person is called the Samkṣipta-rūci. On the other hand, there are other persons, called the Madhyama-rūci, who emphasise the distinction (Viśēṣa-bhēda-naya) between one attribute and another and hold that the attributes in a Siddha are infinite in number.

A Siddha is generally distinguished by eight attributes. These may be described and discussed as follows :—

1. Samyaktva or indestructible faith in the nature of the reals. Before the attainment of his Siddha-hood, the advancing person begins with a strong belief that his self alone is what is to be stuck to. This belief ripens into an unflinching belief in the efficacy of self-development on the one hand and on the other, an unshakeable conviction as to the foreignness of the non-psychical realities.

2. Kēvala-jñāna or omniscience. During the period of his self-culture, the advancing man developed a calm and unruffled knowledge about his own self ;—this self-knowledge develops in his Siddha-hood, in a detailed knowledge of all the objects of the Universe.

3. Kēvala-darśana or infinite apprehension. During the period of his self-culture, the advancing man attained a vision of his pure self in its universal aspect and this vision develops in his Siddha-hood, in a vision of all the objects of the universe in their generality.

4. Ananta-vīrya or unbounded power. During the period of his self-evolution, the advancing man

had sometimes to be absolutely unperturbed and self-possessed in the midst of natural and supernatural threatenings around him ; this calmness resulted in the perfect unweariness,—an infinite power,—in the matter of knowing all the objects, when he attained the Siddha-hood.

5. Saukṣmya or extreme subtleness. Omniscience in the Siddha is a reality which not being a gross material object is not an object of other people's sensuous experience. Omniscience is the very nature of the Siddha, who is thus too subtle to be sensuously perceived.

6. Avagāhana or inter-penetrability. A Siddha is not a material thing which prevents another thing from occupying its space. Accordingly, one Siddha is no obstruction in any way to the other Siddhas. He is like a light which does not obstruct the presence of other lights.

7. Aguru-laghutva or the feature of being neither heavy nor light. It is said that if a Siddha were heavy he would fall down like a ball of iron ; and that if he were light, he would be ceaselessly moving like cotton subjected to the blow of air. The Siddha is accordingly neither heavy nor light.

8. Avyābādha or uninterrupted infinite joy. Before the attainment of the Siddha-hood, the advancing man had a partial taste of bliss, due to the suppression of the feelings of attachment etc. This partial taste of happiness developed in his Siddha-hood, in a permanent sense of uninterrupted joy.

A Siddha is thus perfectly uninfluenced by the material Karma-forces and is possessed of the

above eight prominent attributes. In this connection, reference may be made to some doctrines of the Jainas, regarding the Siddha, which in some respects are remarkable.

(1) First of all, a Siddha is said to be Nitya or eternal. This means that although a soul attains liberation at a certain point of time, his Siddhahood remains eternal. A liberated being never again becomes unliberated and bound in worldly existences. This Jaina doctrine is opposed to the contention of the Sadāśiva school of thinkers, according to whom, at the expiration of one hundred Kalpas or cosmic ages, the world becomes a void and then a Siddha comes back into it once more.

(2) It is said that a Siddha is a little less in dimension than the last body in which he was encased. To this Jaina doctrine, some e.g. the Naiyāyikas are opposed, who contend that as soon as the last body drops from the Siddha, he expands himself to the last limit of the universe, just like light which expands itself as soon as the cover is removed from it. The Jainas set aside this objection by pointing out that what is possible in the case of light is not possible in the case of a Jīva. It is the nature of light to expand itself but the nature of a Jīva is not such. The largeness or the smallness of the bulk in the body of a Jīva is not due to anything in the nature of the Jīva but to the nature of the Karma-matter which comes to be attached to it. There is accordingly nothing in the nature of a liberated being to make it all-pervasive spatially.

(3) According to the Jainas, a Siddha, as soon as he attains the Siddha-hood, has an upward motion and goes straight upward until he reaches the place, known as the Siddha-śilā at the summit of the universe where he stays permanently thenceforward. In opposition to this doctrine, some question : How can the Siddha assume this upward motion and why should he not stay where he attains the Siddhahood ? Umā-Svāmī in his Tattvārtha-Sūtra explains how this is possible. In the first place, he says that in order to attain his Siddha-hood, the Jīva has been exerting himself for a considerable length of time, so when he attains his goal, the momentum of his exertion continues for a certain time in the form of an upward motion (‘Pūrva-prayōgāt’), just as a moving wheel continues to move for a certain time even after the moving agents are removed. In the next place, he shows how a dry and emptied pumpkin, when plastered with mud, goes down in the water and how it comes up when the mud upon it is washed off in the water. In the same manner, a soul remains bound in the world as long as the Karma-dirt is attached to it and goes up to the Siddha-Śilā as soon as that dirt is removed from it (‘Asangatvāt’). Thirdly, Umā-svāmī points out that just as Eranda-seed is found to move when the sheaths etc. covering it are cut off, the emancipated soul moves up automatically as soon as the Karma-covers are removed from it (‘Bandha-çchēdāt’). Lastly, Umā-Svāmī shows how a blaze of fire moves this side and that side and so on, so long as air blows upon it ; it burns steady, and

straight upwards when it is not so disturbed by air; in the same manner, a freed soul has an upward motion ('Tathā-gati-pariṇāmāt'), when it is no longer influenced by the Karmas.

It is to be noted that the place where the Siddhas remain is at the top of the universe which is reached by them by an upward motion. Beyond this place, however, the Siddhas cannot rise. Why? The reason is that a Siddha in his upward journey to the Siddha-śilā is helped by Dharma, a principle which helps a being's motion. Beyond the Siddha-śilā, is the infinite Alōka or void space where the principle of Dharma is absent. This assistant cause of motion, Dharma, being absent in the Alōka, the Siddha stops and stays at the said summit of the universe and cannot go further and enter the limitless void. But although he cannot enter the Alōka, the Alōka is not outside the ambit of his knowledge. Like the Lōka or the world, the Alōka also is known to the Siddha, because he is omniscient.

(4) As a real being, even the finally liberated Siddha has principles of origination and decay, operative in his nature. This is an important point which distinguishes the Jaina view of the emancipated state from that of the other schools, according to which the Mōkṣa or the state of final emancipation is a perfectly colourless one of unmodified identity. It is contended by the objectors that a Siddha, since he has fully realised and perfected his self, has not to undergo any modification by births and deaths in various manners and that therefore any modification in

the nature of the Siddha's self is impossible. The Jainas in defence of their theory point out that things increase and decrease, that they have their phenomenal origins and decays and a persistence among those facts of origin and decay, in respect of their eternal substantial basis. In the omniscience of the Siddha, all things are reflected exactly as they are and if these have their undoubted modifications, the corresponding knowing nature of the Siddha also can be said to have corresponding modifications (-in the words of Brahma-dēva- "Pratikṣaṇam Jnēya-padārthāḥ pariṇamanti, tat-pariṇāṣa-yākārēṇa.....Siddha-jñānamapi pariṇamati"). The modifications (pariṇāma) in the nature of the Siddha arise from within itself and are all due to itself. The colourless self-identity of a liberated being is no reality in the accepted sense of the word. A real is what sustains itself in and through its varying phases or in the words of the Jaina philosophers, what has an origin (utpāda), a decay (vyaya) and a substantial persistence (dhrauvya). The Siddha-state has the liberated being as its substantial basis or permanent support while the continuous evolutions of knowledge and joy etc,-one series of such evolutions arising and another decaying and so on and on,-go on succeeding each other within itself. The reality,-the very life of the Siddha-hood consists in this eternal play of succeeding series of blissful apprehensions and all-knowing cognitions, upon the permanent stage of the psychical identity of the Siddha.

It is no good concealing the fact that there is some difficulty in properly understanding the

character of some of the abovementioned features of the Siddha. A Siddha is a disembodied immaterial and purely spiritual being and to apply empirical characteristics to a transcendental reality like his nature is practically to contradict it. Take for instance, the attribute of Avagāhana. To say that a number of Siddhas can occupy one and the same space or interpenetrate each other is to apply the category of spatiality to their psychical nature. To attribute Agurulaghutva to a Siddha i.e. to look upon him as neither heavy nor light is similarly an attempt to understand his nature in terms of weighing and measurement. Even to call the Siddha 'Nitya' or eternal is hardly permissible because that would be applying the time-category of duration to a nature which transcends all categories of space and time. Why again say that the Siddha has a dimension, a little less than that of the body which he had for the last time ? It is even said that the Siddha has a shadowy shape and is of the form of a human being ; this is almost an application of materiality to a being which is purely spiritual. To hold that the disembodied being of the Siddha has an upward motion is similarly to invest it with something of materiality.

The difficulties about a correct conception of a Siddha's attributes, as pointed out above, may disappear if we recall how the Jaina writers often describe a thing from varied points of view. In the case of a Siddha, we must note that from a strictly metaphysical view-point, he is essentially a spiritual being and as such, formless. But such an immaterial conception is not at all easy ; to

begin with, one cannot wholly dispense with the application of categories of grossness. We think, the description of the Siddha as of the form of a human being, is due to such a consideration. In explaining the doctrine of the Siddha as of the human shape, Brahma-dēva pointedly asserts that from the Niścaya-naya or strictly metaphysical stand-point, the Siddha is 'Nirākāra' (shapeless), 'Atindriya' (supersensuous) and 'Amūrta' (formless). Yet, he says, from the Vyavahāra-naya or practical consideration, the Siddha is to be viewed as 'Purisāyārō' or of the human form. It is said that at the moment when the advancing person gives up the last trace of Karma viz, the Śarīrōpānga, which accounted for his sublimbs, his body becomes contracted a little. The last particles of Karma even the Kārmana-Śarīra or body constituted of the subtlest matter, having left the Siddha at this final stage he appears like a shadowy mass, a little less in dimension than his last body. This shadowy body does not attach to the Siddha in his Siddhahood ; but for an easy and off-hand understanding of the features of a Siddha, he is conceived to be encased in this shadowy, contracted body.

The same consideration will dispel the inconsistency in the conception of the Siddha as Aguru-laghu. The last shadowy body is for all practical purposes neither heavy nor light and when the Siddha is said to be Aguru-laghu, it may be said that by describing the Siddha as neither heavy nor light, an attempt is made to explain his spiritual nature through materialistic phraseology. A

material thing is either heavy or light, so that when the Siddha is said to be Aguru-laghu, he is indicated to be something different from matter. This explanation of ours receives support from the interpretation put upon Aguru-laghu by some of the Jaina thinkers, according to whom, it means that the Siddha is detached from the Gōtra-Karma i.e. the family-determining material principle and that he is a purely impersonal being to whom the status of either a high or a low lineage is wholly inapplicable.

The alleged urddhagati or the upward motion of the Siddha—a feature present only in a material being,—can be defended in a similar way, on a practical consideration. The flying up of the Siddha from this mundane world indicates the extreme repugnance of his spiritual nature to all things material. The Siddha's staying at the top of the universe points similarly to his spirituality being distinct from and absolutely unconnected with material sphere. The conception of the eternality of Siddhahood, although inappropriate, being due to the application of the category of time to a transcendental being, is justifiable on the similar ground of distinguishing the spiritual character of the Siddha from the character of material things. The attribution of Avagāhana also is explaining the immaterial with the help of phrases and facts, found valid in the material plane.

The respective view-points of the Niścaya and the Vyavahāra in connection with the nature of the Siddha may thus be made clear. The Siddha is

a pure spiritual being,—this is the Niṣṇaya or the true metaphysical truth. But if at the outset, you cannot comprehend this spirituality or you want to utilise this conception in your day-to-day dealings,—well, then, take your stand on Vyavahāra or your empirical experience. You understand a thing or a being if it has a physical frame. Now, try to think of the Siddha as a being having a frame which is a misty mass, absolutely devoid of all material grossness. You know a thing by its weight ; conceive the Siddha as a being who is neither heavy nor light. You understand the nature of a thing by its motion to-ward or from-ward a thing ; the Siddha moves away-far, far away from the material world. You know a thing by its position ; try to think of a Siddha as a being who stays at the summit of the universe, perfectly untouched by it. A material thing is known by its duration in time ; well, think of the Siddha who is not limited by your experiential moments of time. Lastly, if occupation of space and resistance to another be a feature by which you know a material thing,—conceive the Siddha as a being who stays in a spot without resisting the other beings of his class, occupying the very same spot. By attempting thus to apply to the Siddha, the categories of our empirical experiences about the material things, we see that those categories cannot be applied to the Siddha in the sense they are applied to a material thing and are thus led, step by step, to understand the ultimate futility and uselessness of applying the material categories to the Siddha and thereby to form at long last a true

idea about the Siddha as a purely immaterial and spiritual being.

From what has been said above, the points of difference between the Jaina view of liberation and the Vēdānta view should be sufficiently clear. Brahma who may be taken as essentially free has no differentiations whatsoever, according to the Vēdāntists. Brahma has no “Sva-gata-bhēda” or essential differentiation within its own nature. Its so called features of ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘bliss’ are not its attributes on the one hand nor are they mutually different from and exclusive of each other. According to the Vēdānta, undifferentiated ‘Sat’, ‘Çit’ and ‘Ānanda’ are the very nature of the Brahma and these three are identical. The Jaina view, on the contrary is that ‘consciousness’ ‘bliss’ etc. are attributes attached to a liberated being. Although an attribute has no separate existence from its support, the substance, the latter is in some respects, conceivably separate from the attribute. The Jainas further maintain that the attributes of a liberated being are not only separate from the latter in some sense but are mutually different from each other,—although they are identical in the sense that they are the attributes of one and the same being. Ananta-vīrya, for instance, is not the same as the Ananta-darśana and Ananta-jñāna, as Ananta-sukha. The Siddha has thus Sva-gata-bhēda, in some respects.

Brahma being one and the second-less, there is no other reality beside it. It has no ‘Sajātiya-bhēda’, according to the Vēdānta,—in as much as there are not a number of Brahmas or free beings.

The Jainas, on the contrary maintain that each soul is separate from the other,—for, otherwise one soul being liberated, all the other souls would have been liberated and one soul, remaining bound, there would be no salvation for any of the other souls. Souls are really different, although they are, in some sense, one, being possessed of a number of self-same attributes. The difference between one soul and another continues even when both of them attain the final liberation. A liberated being has the 'Sajātiya-bhēda' i.e. is differentiated from the other liberated beings. In a manner, this view is shared with the Jainas by the thinkers of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya and the Yōga schools as well as by the Vēdāntists of the non-absolutist sections.

According to the Vēdānta, there is no reality other than the Brahma. The Brahma is essentially free ; it is free at all times ; its bondage and emancipation as well as its manifoldness are only apparent. It alone is and there is no other, either similar to (Sajātiya) or different from (Vijātiya) it. The Sāṅkhya-Yōga thinkers, however, reject this extreme monism and admit the separate reality of the Prakṛti. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also admit in a similar manner, the independent realities of Time, Space and Material Atoms. According to the Jainas, besides the reality of an infinite number of souls, there are a number of non-psychical reals,—Pudgala or matter, Kāla or attendant condition of change, Ākāśa or attendant condition of accommodation and Dharma and Adharma which are attendant principles of motion

and rest. It is said that these non-psychical principles persist and appear as fully existent and real to a soul, even when it has attained the final liberation. One may surmise that the undeniable existence of these Vijātiya realities might have led the Jainas to assert such apparently unintelligible doctrines as that the Siddha has a shadowy body, that he has an upward motion, that he has his location at the top of the universe, that he allows the other Siddhas to occupy the self-same space with himself, that he has a weight which is neither heavy nor light and that his reality is co-extensive with the duration of an infinite time. At any rate the Jaina theory about the Vijātiya-Bhēda, in the Siddha is as pronounced as its other doctrines about his Sva-gata and Sajātiya Bhēdas.

The Siddha is a purely spiritual being, finally freed from the shackles of Karma or material influences. This emancipation from Karmic bondage endows the Siddha with perfect bliss, power, knowledge and apprehension. He is called the 'Jina', because he is the conqueror of the terrible Karma-foes. The name Jina is given to Buddha by the Buddhists for the same reasons. The name 'Sugata' also is applied by the Buddhists to Buddha but the Jainas point out that to the Siddha may be given the name Sugata because he has got ('gata') the best ('su') of things viz. the pure knowledge or because he has attained ('gata') the best ('su') and the eternal status of absolute freedom. It would be interesting to note here how the Jainas show that some of the names given to their Highest Lord by the orthodox Vēdic school may also be

connected with the Siddha. Thus the Jainas point out that the transcendental character of the being of the Siddha will explain his appellation, 'Paramātmā'. Through his omniscience, the Siddha knows all the objects of the Lōka or the universe and the Alōka or the void space itself ; he pervades the Lōka and the Alōka, as it were, through his pure knowledge and may fitly be called the 'Viṣṇu'. He is possessed of infinite bliss and is contented beyond measure. Sensuality (Abrahma) cannot yield greater pleasure to him and even the heavenly damsels, as the Jainas say, like Urvaśī, Rambhā and Tilottamā cannot have any charm for the Siddha. He is accordingly honoured as the 'Parama-brahma' or the greatest of all abstemious beings. The Siddha has attained omniscience, infinite apprehension, boundless joy and unlimited power ; even the Indras or the lords of the celestial regions are covetous of the Siddha-status and are anxious to serve the Siddha, if he would like to have their services. The Siddha is consequently looked upon as the 'Īśvara' or the supreme Lord. The Jainas call the Siddha, 'Śiva'; he is so called because he has attained the status of liberation, the *snmmum bonum* ('parama-Kalyāṇa') which is supremely good ('Śiva') and is an end (to one's worldly pains) and which consists in inexhaustible pure knowledge.

Before we bring to close our consideration of the nature of emancipation and the emancipated being, we may make a short reference to the contention between the Digambara and the Śvētāmbara schools of the Jainas, regarding the capacity of

females for attaining Mukti or liberation ;—the former, maintaining that women are incapable of attaining Mukti and the latter holding that they are competent for securing it. The arguments in the *Pramēya-kamala-mārtanda*, in support of the Digambara view are as follows :—An extremity ('parama-prakarṣa') in one direction can be reached only by one who can go to the other extreme and conversely, the extremity in one direction cannot be reached by one who is incapable of going to the extremity in the opposite direction. An eunuch for instance, is incapable of going to the extreme of wickedness and is found incapable of reaching the extreme of goodness also. An eunuch does on no occasion go to the seventh hell, nor can he attain the perfection of the Siddha. A man is capable of committing the worst of sins and can go to the nethermost of the hellish regions ; he can also develop his self to perfection and attain the final emancipation. These are admitted facts,—finding place in the Scriptural texts, honoured by both the schools, Digambara and the Śvētāmbara. It is also an admitted fact that a female is never condemned to the worst hell. This goes to show that she is incapable of committing the worst of sins. From her incapacity to reach the extreme in one direction viz, the direction of sinfulness, it follows that she is incapable of reaching the extreme in the side of self-development also. Final liberation Mukti or Siddha-hood is thus unattainable by a woman. It is urged that a female can go to the extreme, so far as Māyā or deceitfulness is concerned. The texts which are quoted to prove this,

show, however, that the females are only capable of doing many grave deceitful acts but that they never go to the extremity of deceitfulness. This is well established by the texts which forbid the entrance of females into the seventh hell. Restraint (Samyama) in its fullness which is a step to spiritual liberation, is impossible in a female. It is a matter of experience that even so much of 'restraint' which yields supernatural 'gains'—in our earthly life, is impracticable for a woman. A female is always covered in clothes and 'being-clad-in-clothes' (Saçēlatva) is an hindrance to the final liberation. Restraint or renunciation in the form of giving up the wearing of apparels being thus impossible in a woman, Mukti which is consequent on 'Açēlatva' or a sansculotic state is inattainable by her. You cannot say that a female can have spiritual emancipation inspite of her wearing clothes, although a man cannot attain liberation unless and until he is perfectly unclad. Mukti or final liberation is of one sort only,—it cannot be of two kinds, one as the result of or rather, inspite of wearing clothes and the other, consequent on sansculotism. Cloth-wearing cannot be permissible for a person on the way to liberation, for, it is not a commendable act. This is evidenced by the text that a Sādhu who is initiated into the Order only on the day is to be well respected by a man (evidently, cloth-covered) who has been initiated a hundred years before. The reason is obvious. To put on a cloth indicates that the wearer is not a renouncer in respect of outside things. The wearing of the cloth further shows that the

wearer has the internal feelings of care and beautification for his body, left in him still. It cannot be contended that a cloth does not indicate one's love for his body but is meant for a moral purpose viz. for taking the external minute animalcules from the heat of the cloth-wearer's body. The fact that the Arhat teaches without any cloth covering his body shows conclusively that cloth-wearing cannot be a moral act. Besides, the animalcules will not be saved from the heat of one's body, even if the person wears a cloth, for, there are uncovered parts in his body still, which emit heat. Tiny invisible organisms in the air are killed by tightening, folding or otherwise dressing the cloth. Cloth-wearing cannot be a moral act and females to whom cloth-wearing is indispensable are incapable of perfect self-development. 'Samyama' or restraint which leads to Mukti, consists in renouncing all matters, both internal and external. Cloth-wearing requires securing of clothes, sewing and repairing them when necessary, washing and drying them; it causes mental unrest, when cloth is stolen by thieves. All these show that cloth-wearing, far from being helpful to the practice of Samyama, positively opposes it. If you say that cloth is necessary for a Sādhū for averting cold etc. one may argue that other objects of enjoyment also should be enjoyed by a Sādhū, in order to remove the lust for those objects which arises in him. If it be said that cloth may be worn by one without any real feeling for the cloth, it may as well be said that 'even a woman may be enjoyed by a Sādhū

without any real attachment to her'. Lastly, it is argued that cloth may be worn by one without any detriment to one's spiritual development,—just as food and medicine are taken or as the Piçcha or the brush which is used by the Jaina Sādhus to send away the flies gently, is carried by him. The contention is fallacious. Piçcha, food and medicine, do not give rise to any internal spirit of attachment or appropriation of external things for the up-keep and betterment of one's body. Piçcha prevents flies from being killed inadvertently, food and medicine taken at the proper time prevent one's untimely death; so these are not detrimental to one's attainment of the Mōksa but are in a way, helpful to it. Cloth, on the contrary, is not a thing of that nature; its use can be safely dispensed with; its wearing involves a feeling 'this is mine';—without some care, without some attention paid to the cloth, one cannot wear cloth; accordingly, cloth-wearing cannot but generate a feeling of attachment, which is fatal to one's ultimate self-realisation. Females to whom cloth-wearing is indispensable are consequently unable to attain Mokṣa.

On the other hand, the arguments in the Ratnākarā vatārikā, supporting the doctrine of a female's capacity for attaining Mōkṣa are summarised as follows:—Salvation involves the fullest development of knowledge etc. in a person. The fullest development of any psychical capacity is said to be impossible in a woman on the ground that a woman is incapable of going down to the seventh hell, which involves the fullest possible

development of the vicious tendency. The contention that the fullest development of any psychical capacity is impossible in a woman is contradicted by the admitted fact that when the deluding '(Mōhaniya) Karma exists in a woman in its extreme form, she has the 'female-cravings' (Strī-vēda) etc. in their extreme form. Another argument against the doctrine of the female salvation is said to be" "A female cannot have salvation because she has "the spirit of appropriation" (Parigraha) like an ordinary house-holder. "This argument is based on the fact of a woman's putting on cloth. It may be urged, however, in reply to this argument that the cloth worn by a woman, far from being an article of her liking, is only a means to the development of her virtue and as such, is never a thing to which she may be said to be attached. Shortly speaking, this is the line of counter-arguments, put forward by the Śvētāmbara thinkers against the contention of the Digambara, regarding the impossibility of a female attaining the Mōkṣa. The former develop the following positive argument in support of their doctrine,—"A female of the human species is capable of attaining liberation ; because she can develop in her the exact cause of the liberation ; just like a male person." This exact or the unfailing cause of liberation consists in the possession of the "Three jewels of Right, Faith, etc." in their absolute purity. That these three jewels may be possessed by a woman is a fact beyond question. The possession of these three jewels is not present in the eunuchs who do not consequently

attain liberation. The Śvētāmbaras point out that “some females of the human species, on account of their having the exact cause of liberation, do attain liberation, because they have the right to take to the state of a homeless, wandering recluse ; just like a male person.” The Scripture is found to lay down “a pregnant woman or a woman who has an infant to maintain should not enter the Order of homelessness.” This clearly shows that a woman has the right to enter the Order of the homeless saints. It excludes certain classes of women from the Order and by implication, upholds the right of the rest. Even now are found females who have plucked off their hair and who carry with them the Piçcha, the Kamaṇḍalu (wooden water-pot) and other belongings of a Yati or homeless ascetic, -which shows that women have certainly the right to adopt the state of a religious wanderer. Females are not necessarily bound to be subordinate to man. If a female of a hundred years’ initiation is asked to honour a recently initiated Sādhu, ladies like the Arhat’s mother are respected by the heavenly lords. The fact that women cannot develop some of the ‘Labdhis’ or ‘Ṛddhis’ i.e. supernatural powers does not prove that they are incapable of liberating themselves. The Gaṇadharas and other high-souled Kṣatriya princes of the times of the Arhats were not possessed of these supernatural powers but this did not disable them from attaining the Mōkṣa. If a female is on the right path to self-perfection, there is nothing inconsistent in her attaining the Sādhu-hood or the Mōkṣa according to the Śvētām-

baras. The fact that a female is generally weak in constitution, is irrelevant. Liberation does not depend on one's physical strength. It depends on one's having Right Faith etc. This is proved by the fact that a physically weak male person who can be easily overpowered even by a female, attains Mōkṣa if he has got the three Jewels. A disciple who is acknowledged to be subordinate to his teacher, is liberated if he is possessed of Right Faith etc. In spite of the fact that the practice of some of the penances and austerities are forbidden to a female this does not indicate that she is thereby incapacitated from attaining the Mōkṣa. "In the sacred writings, there are various forms of penances effecting the Samvara (the stoppage of Karmic inflow into the soul) and the Nirjarā (the partial annihilation of the Karma)—just as there are varied forms of the treatment of a disease, of which some are efficacious to some people (and others, to others)" The Śvētāmbara thinkers challenge the truth of the proposition that because a person has not the capacity to do extremely wrongful acts, the person must be judged to be wanting in the capacity to do the extremely good acts also. It is true that a woman always wears cloth and that even the Scripture enjoins the wearing of cloth by a woman. But this does not show that the female must be fondly attached to the cloth. A female saint may be as unattached to her cloth as to her body. The woman is recommended by the Scripture to put on cloth for the safety of her character and conduct. Cloth is no impediment to her attainment of the Mōkṣa but

is rather helpful to it. It is meaningless to say that a female saint wearing a cloth has any feeling of attachment for it ; for, women on the way to liberation are not unoften found prepared to sacrifice even their lives for liberating themselves. In this manner, the Śvētāmbaras argue that a female is capable of attaining the final liberation.

We do not feel inclined to pursue the rival contentions any further.

In the orthodox Vēdic systems of philosophy, it is generally assumed that females, on account of their 'Anadhikāra' (or, want of any birth-right) to take scriptural training as well as training in matters spiritual are incapable of attaining the final liberation, although in some of the most prominent Upaniṣads, we find ladies taking full part in the debates regarding some of the abstruse problems about the self and its ultimate basis. In the Gītā, it is no doubt stated that under proper self-culture, "even women, traders and serving people can attain the best of the states (i. e. Mōkṣa)", but the prevalent trend indicated in that saying is unmistakable viz. that a female cannot get the ultimate salvation. As regards the Buddhist doctrine about the female's Mōkṣa, we are told that Buddha was at first opposed to the introduction of women devotees into his Order and that even when he agreed to take them into it at the earnest entreaties of some of his prominent disciples, he is said to have predicted that this would lead to the decay of his order in some distant future. Islam goes to the extent of maintaining that women have no souls and that as such, they being

no better than chattels, the question of their spiritual emancipation does not arise at all. Christianity, on the other hand, seems to have recognised the spiritual capabilities of females from the very outset and we find devout Christian ladies admitted into the Order, from the time of the inception of the Church. In the pastoral Epistles, we come across a class of widows who were not mere recipients of relief but who constituted an ecclesiastical grade. In the Acts ix, 39, a number of women belonging to the ecclesiastical Order, appear to be united in some kind of community. Tertullian and Cyprian make prominent mention of a long-established separate order of virgins in the Church. Athanasius states that when Anthony was about to begin his solitary life, he first placed his sister in a convent of virgins. In the shorter recension of the Ignatian Epistle to the Smyrnacans, we find mention of "the virgins who are called widows". All these go to show that the early Christianity admitted the females in a Church-Order, separate from that of men. Later on, when Benedict introduced the much-needed reforms in the Church organisation, the spiritual capabilities of females were not forgotten but emphasised, so as to arrange for their development to the fullest extent. The result was that the spiritual descendants of Scholastica, sister of Benedict, not only played an important part in the ecclesiastical history but exerted a vast influence upon society in general.

THE ĀCĀRYYA, THE UPĀDHYĀYA AND THE SĀDHU.

The Siddha is the spirit realised in its purity. He remains as the transcendent being, absolutely unconnected with the mundane beings and their affairs. He does not come forward to declare and teach the truths which he has realised. Ordinary people would have remained unredeemed, had there been none to reveal the truths about the self and the non-self. It was the Arhat who saved humanity from this sure and all-round degradation. Like the Siddha, he perfected his self but unlike the former, the Arhat, out of his boundless pity for the suffering creatures took the self-imposed trouble of revealing, declaring and teaching the truths which he had realised. Yet more is necessary for the moral and religious uplift of the people. The Samavaśaraṇa or the lecture-hall of the Arhat was open to all beings of his time but was not eternal. It had its end and it vanished. The people of the succeeding ages had not the benefit of learning direct from the great Teacher. His words remained and the believers were left to solve their difficulties and regulate their conduct in light of his teachings. With the final departure of the Arhat, the preservation of his teachings and their correct interpretation would have been impossible but for those great persons who followed the footsteps of their great Master. In the Jaina community, these high-souled beings are called

the Ācāryyas, the Upādhyāyas and the Sādhus. On the one hand, in their character and conduct, they observe the precepts of the Arhat faithfully and on the other, it is their mission to broadcast among the people the great truths revealed by him. The Ācāryyas, the Upādhyāyas and the Sādhus not only teach but practise what they teach.

Thus, about the Ācāryya, we are told that he observes the five “Ācāras” and leads others to practise them (‘Appamparam ça jungjai’). The five Ācāras are as follows :—

1. Darśanācāra :—Darśana consists in the unflinching faith that the soul characterised by pure consciousness and free from the touches of all modes of non-psychical Karma, is what alone is to be realised and acting always in accordance with this faith is the Darśanācāra.

2. Jñānācāra :—True knowledge or Samyak-Jñāna is the cognitive realisation that the self is essentially unconnected with all forms of delusion and feelings of attachment and aversion. Acts regulated in accordance with such knowledge is Jñānācāra.

3. Ācāritrācāra :—Ācāritra is a perfectly calm mind freed from the disturbances due to attachment etc, and contented with the enjoyment of the joy which is natural to the soul. Ācāritrācāra consists in actions, permeated by such a tranquil spirit.

4. Tapācāra :—This means internally a perfect suppression of all desires for objects foreign to the self and externally, a practice of fasting and other penances (altogether 12 in number),—the two

lines of conduct leading to the establishment of one's self in itself.

5. *Vīryāçāra* :—*Vīrya* indicates power. *Vīryāçāra* means acts calculated to protect the practice of the foregoing four *Āçāras*.

An *Āçārya* is so called because he practises the five *Āçāras*. He is endowed with 36 best qualities.

An *Upādhyāya* is possessed of 'the three jewels' i.e. right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. He is a *Yati* because of his 'Yatna' or effort to fix himself in his own self by overpowering the lure for the objects of the five senses. Thus, well-advanced in the way of self-culture, the *Upādhyāya* is the fit person to be the teacher. He is characterised by his ceaseless preaching before the enquirers,—'*niççam dhammova isanē 'niradō'*'; he teaches people the eternal truths, that there are six substances (*dravya*), that of these six, five are substances having parts (*astikāya*), that there are seven categories (*tattvas*) etc. etc., that of the substances one's own self alone is to be realised and the others to be avoided and that one's actions are to be guided by a spirit of forgiveness etc.

A *Sādhu*, on the other hand, is not so much concerned about teaching others as about purifying his own conduct. He knows that right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are the only way to the final emancipation and his constant care is to see that his acts and conduct be always 'pure' *niçça-sudham* i.e. free from selfish feelings and 'permeated by right faith and right knowledge'. Well-equipped with the best mode of acting, known as '*Ārādhana*' which consists in four sorts of

penances or outward abstemiousness and four sorts of internal meditations,—a Sādhū advances on the way to the final liberation.

In the Ācārya, the Upādhyāya and the Sādhū, the eternal messages of the Arhat are thus kept alive and faithfully acted upto. It is these three that carry those teachings to people who need them. In the Siddha, divinity or the true character of the self has been realised but he does not proclaim it. The Arhat also attains that divine state but it is he who, at some propitious time, faithfully states what he has realised. The Siddha is thus God as he is in himself, the transcendent and un-revealing Reality, while the Arhat is God as the Revealer, the Word, the authoritative Teacher for all beings. But an Arhat does not appear in all ages. His teachings embody truths and nothing but truths and these require not only to be believed in, known and acted upto by successive generations of earnest people, but are to be explained and preached before honest enquirers,—in order that these messages may be preserved. These last are exactly the duties and functions of the Ācārya, the Upādhyāya and the Sādhū. In the Ācārya, the Upādhyāya and the Sādhū, the eternal message and truth of divinity is kept alive and the Ācārya, the Upādhyāya and the Sādhū may thus be fitly looked upon as the Holy Spirit, the third God in the Divine Trinity.

In contradistinction from other religions it is generally said that while most of the other religions lay exclusive emphasis on individual self-culture and self-perfection, Christianity was from its

inception "a community religion." The Christian religion does not consist in self-centering but in feeling for "the brothers-in-faith." Accordingly, it early evolved the Church-organisation. The conception of the Church has widened from time to time and we hear of the Catholic Church and the Universal Church. It would be seen, however, that the Jaina descriptions of the Ācārya and the Upādhyāya unmistakably hint at Prabhāvanā or explaining the matters of faith to those who want them. In spite of the fact that the Christian people formed a faithful band, the bond which tied the common people to the Elders in the early Christendom was more external than spiritual. It has been found that alms-giving was enjoined on all the true believers by the early Christianity as a practice of great merit and that the early religious Elders were only men, appointed to take charge of the collections and to distribute them rightly. That was the function of the religious Elders and as custodians of the alms and as persons, entrusted with the superintendence of charities, these Elders had a certain amount of disciplinary control over all the 'brothers-in-faith,' who, as recipients of charities, flocked to them. Originally, it was no part of the duties of the Elders, to teach and "the earliest office-bearers (in the Christian Churches) were men who ruled rather than men who taught." The bond of union between the Church Elders and the common believers was thus artificial, so to say. Far other, however, was the tie between the Jaina lay people and the Ācārya and the Upādhyāya. The former were attached to the

latter but were not drawn to them by any materialistic consideration. The Ācāryas and the Upādhyāyas, no doubt, ministered to the hunger of the people who were attached to them, but the hunger was not physical. It was a spiritual hunger which was appeased by the Jaina Ācāryas and Upādhyāyas. Unlike the case of the early Christian Elders, it was the primary function of the Jaina Ācāryas and Upādhyāyas to teach and the bond between them and the lay people was consequently spiritual,—a deeper and a stronger one.

This duty of teaching necessitated the development of learning, self-control and strength of character in the Sādhus, the Ācāryas and the Upādhyāyas of the Jaina community. Indeed, self-culture and purity of conduct were praised so much by the Jainas that they were prepared to honour those virtues even in non-Jaina people. This is evident from the tone of the last Mantra,—*Namō Lōē Śavva Sāhūnām*,—which implies that a Jaina honours the purity of conduct, wherever it is found, no matter even if it be in a non-Jaina. This is a liberalness of view, a broad-minded impartiality which should form the basis of a true religious disposition.

Vēdic school reserves true self-culture for select groups of people within its fold and Buddhism which widens its scope is nevertheless inclined to hold that a truly religious man must not only have his faith in the Law and the Congregation but also in Buddha. Islam is praised by its admirers for the liberalness of its view but the liberalness which

it embodies is limited within the community of the believers in Islam only. The Christian religion claims to be fully Catholic and the Church honoured by it, is conceived to be 'Universal'. Yet, the 'visible' churches in the Christendom, many and varied as they are, are sharply distinguished from each other, showing that the 'invisible' i.e., the spirit underlying one of them is to some extent distinct from that underlying the other. Accordingly, no 'visible' Christian Church can claim to be really 'Universal' and as a matter of fact, the fusion of the various churches has not been possible. Presence of a particular dogma or of a peculiar debatable doctrine prevents any organisation from being Universal. If the 'visible' churches of the Christendom are to be universal they must rid their 'invisible' basis of all forms of narrowness. Self-culture and absolute purity of conduct should be made the sole essentiality in the character of a religious man. It is only when the 'invisible' church becomes free from all modes of one-sidedness that a church can claim to be 'Universal'. It may be said that the Jaina conception about the character of a Sādhu and the Jaina veneration for a Sādhu, no matter of whatever place, origin or religion the Sādhu may be, show the fundamental universalness of the Jaina religion.

CHAPTER III

THE NAMASKĀRA

According to the Jainas, the Mahā-Mantra, having for its objects the five groups of high-souled beings, referred to in the last chapter, is of supreme efficiency. It is said to be capable of yielding results which are desirable, both in one's mundane life and in the life thereafter. In this chapter, the possibility of its such efficiency, will be shortly considered from the ontological standpoint and we shall first take up the question of its efficiency in one's mundane life.

How can the Mahā-Mantra yield fruits which will be useful in this life? The Siddhas and the Arhats are no longer existent in this mundane world nor are they interested in any way with the worldly affairs. However much one may pray to them, the prayers will not move them to bestow any gifts upon the devotees. The Ācāryas, the Upādhyāyas and the Sādhus, even if they be living contemporaneously with the devotees, will not fulfil their desires; for they are too spiritually disposed to think of any earthly goods either for themselves or for their devotees. It is thus clear that the five groups of the great beings, honoured in the Mahā-Mantras, cannot be persuaded to be sympathetically or charitably disposed towards the devotees, in order that the latter may secure any earthly benefits from their worship. In what way, then, can the Mahā-Mantra yield fruits which

are desirable in one's mundane life ? The high-souled beings who are the objects of the Mahā-Mantra, being thus perfectly unconcerned about the worldly needs of the devotees, we must fall back upon the words of the Mahā-Mantra itself, for the fulfilment of their earthly desires. In other words, we must hold that the words of the Mahā-Mantra, if properly uttered, will bring results which are good, so far as one's earthly life is concerned.

It is certainly a matter of pure faith to believe in the efficiency of the Mahā-Mantras. It is impossible to demonstrate it with the methods of our ordinary sensuous experience, unless and until we actually come across a person who is found to be possessed of the earthly benefits by the utterance of the Mahā-Mantra and it is not our business here to enter into any scholastic debate about the certainty of the Mahā-Mantra to yield earthly goods to its utterer. Yet it would not be out of place to examine the ontological basis of such a faith and we may begin this examination with a consideration of the Buddhist theory in connection with this matter. The extreme negativists of the Buddhist school contend that a word is not related to the object, alleged to be signified by it. A word is a concept, clothed in language and a concept is never real. A real is that which is characterised by a practical utility. The word, water, is a concept and it has no relation to reality. One's thirst is not quenched by the utterance of the word, water. The word, water, generates a negative idea in us, -an idea negating all phenomena other than water. Other ideas are foisted

on and mixed up with this original negative apprehension, as a result of which, the word, water, is taken to have a positive significance about the thing called water. Really, however, a word has no connection with the reality, signified by it. Had there been any real connection between the word, Fire and the phenomenon of Fire, our tongues would have been burnt as soon as the word, Fire, was uttered and on the other hand, the place where there was a Fire burning would have been filled with the words, Fire ! Fire ! A corollary from this doctrine of absolute disconnection between words and objects would be the unmaintainability of the claim of the Mahā-Mantra (a collection of words, after all !) to yield any real material fruits. But this extreme Buddhist view loses sight of the fact that it is impossible to deny all relationship between a word and its corresponding object. There is at least the connection of 'the signified' and 'the signifier' (Vāçya-vāçaka-sambandha) between a word and its object. The Nyāya thinkers emphasise this aspect of the matter and point out that a word and its object are related, -at least the former signifying the latter and the latter, being signified by it. According to them, this relationship was fixed by God,—viz., the fact that this or that word should signify this or that object. Questions would arise as to whether according to the Nyāya this relationship was not more than an arbitrary one. The Nyāya thinkers of course left the establishment of this relationship between a word and its object to the will of God. Yet even according to them, the connection between them

was to some extent essential, for the Nyāya view is that a sound (word) is an attribute of Ākāśa, the subtlest form of matter. The philosophers of the Sāṅkya School reject the theory of God and by deriving the gross audible object from the Śabda-tanmātrā or the material element of the subtle sound, hint at a real connection between a sound and its object. The Mīmāṃsā theory of the ultimate transcendental sound is parallel to the Brahma doctrine of the Vēdānta and contends that objects and their corresponding words are derived from one and the same source viz. the nonmenal sound. Whatever differences these theories about sound, of the different schools may have among themselves they all agree in refuting the Buddhist theory and affirming some sort of a real relationship between a word and its object. The Jainas too have their own theory of words. One aspect of the Jaina theory is that besides its conventional sense, a word has a natural capacity of expressing all the objects of the universe. This shows that a word is more than a passing hollow phenomena. It is by its nature capable of expressing objects. The other noticeable point in the Jaina theory is that a linguistic word is not an unsubstantial nothing; but that it is a peculiar modification of Pudgala. If then this Pudgala, modified into Bhāṣā-vargaṇā be the ultimate material basis for linguistic sounds also,—the objects and their signifying words become essentially co-related in and through their common ultimate material noumenal basis. An interesting corollary from this Jaina view would be that more a word (as conceivably in the case

of the Mahā-Mantra) retain its purity, untouched by the on-rushing conventions and keep close to its noumenal source, the greater would be its connection with its object, derived from the ultimate source which is of the same nature as its own, -in accordance with the principle that modification in one part of a substance is co-related to and followed by a corresponding modification in other parts. The Jaina theory of linguistic sounds thus forms the necessary basis, -from the ontological point of view, -for the claim of Mahā-Mantra to secure material benefits for its devout utterer.

The importance of Mahā-Mantra, however, is not to be judged by the earthly benefits which, it is alleged to bestow on its utterers but by the spiritual good it confers on them. The cause of the bondage of a soul, according to the Jaina thought is the influx of material particles into the soul and its ultimate emancipation lies consequently in the eradication of those foreign influences. But before the Karma-matter is fully shaken off, the soul must first take stock of the already accumulated Karma and stop its further influence and thereafter destroy the accumulated stock gradually but surely. The former activity of the soul is called the Samvara and the latter, the Nirjarā. By these two processes, the soul is put on its way to its final liberation, the Mōkṣa and it is said that Dhyāna or meditation brings about the two phenomena of the Samvara and the Nirjarā. It is said that the Mahā-Mantra, when brought into suitable connection with Dhyāna makes it most effective and herein lies the supreme

importance of the Mahā-Mantra. But before we enter into this matter, a consideration of the nature of meditation is necessary. Meditation effects the Samvara and the Nirjarā by helping the growth of the right faith, the right knowledge and the right activity. Now, meditation, to be effective on this line, requires at least three conditions to be fulfilled viz.—1. that the meditator should be properly disposed. 2. that the meditation itself should be of the right sort and 3. that the meditation should be directed to right objects.

Regarding the proper **disposition** of the meditator, it is said that, be an object good or bad, attractive or repulsive, the meditator should never be either stupefied by it (mā mujjhaha) or attached to it (mā rajjaha) or adversely disposed towards it (mā dussaha).

Meditations are of four forms.—viz., the Ārta, the Roudra, the Dharma and the Śukla. Of these, the first two lead to pain and the last two effect the destruction of the Karma. Each of the four forms of meditation is of four modes again.

1. The Ārta-dhyāna. This arises from delusive desires and consists in mistaken persuasions. The four modes of the Ārta-dhyāna are :—(1) that which originates from the loss of what is dear to one :—(2) that which originates from one's contact with what is undesirable ; (3) that which is due to one's illness ; and (4) that which arises from a lust for enjoyable objects.

2. The Roudra-dhyāna. This is due to one's internal evil activities. Its four modes are :—(1) that which generates from a delight in injuring

others ; (2) that which arises from a delight in lying ; (3) that which is due to a delight in stealing ; and (4) that which arises from a delight in hoarding worldly objects.

3. The Dharma-dhyāna. This form of meditation is essentially different from the two foregoing forms. It consists in pious activities and indirectly leads to the final liberation. The four forms of the Dharma-dhyāna are :—(1) In spite of one's own poor intellect, in spite of his having no competent instructor and in spite of his not perceiving the soul etc., because of their supersensuous nature, when one believes in the ultimate reals, simply because the Śiva or the omniscient Lord has spoken of them and because he believes that the Lord has never taught falsely,—his faith rests on the Ājñā or the authoritative teaching of the Śiva and the meditator is said to be in the Ājñā-viçaya form of the Dharma-dhyāna. (2) The next form of the Dharma-dhyāna is the Apāya-viçaya which consists in the contemplation, how persons not developing the right faith, right knowledge and right conduct in them, as taught by the Śiva, suffer miserably in this world, and in the further thought about the means of destroying the Karma in his own self and in the selves of others. (3) The Vipāka-viçaya is the third mode of the Dharma-dhyāna and consists in the realisation that the pleasant or the painful states of a being are all due to his own actions. (4) The Saṁsthāna-viçaya is contemplation about the constitution of the world.

4. The Śukla-dhyāna. This is calm and unperturbed contemplation about the nature of

one's own self. (1) In *Prthaktva-vitarka-viçāra* the first form of the *Śukla-dhyāna*, there is a little disturbance in the manner of meditation. (2) In *Ēkatva-vitarka-viçāra*, the next mode of the *Śukla-dhyāna*, the meditation is perfectly unruffled. (3) In the third *Śukla-dhyāna* which is called the *Sūkṣma-kriyā-pratipāti*, a subtle activity of the body is present while in the (4) *Vyuparata-kriyā-nivṛtti*, even this subsides. The *Śukla-dhyāna* is the best mode of contemplation and is essential to the ultimate attainment of liberation.

As regards the objects of meditation, we may shortly notice its four forms in relation to the objects. These are,—1. the *Piṇdashtha*, 2. *Padashtha*, 3. The *Rūpastha*, 4. the *Rūpātīta*.

1. In the *Piṇdashtha*, the meditator should in the first place have *Pārthivī-dharaṇā*, a mental vision of a calm ocean of milk, a huge, shining lotus in the midst of it, a lofty throne in that lotus and of himself as sitting on that throne. In the next place, he should have what is called the *Āgnēyī-dhāraṇā*. In this vision he sees a beautiful lotus in the hollow of his navel with sixteen petals with fourteen vowels and the word, 'Arham,' marked on them. A column of smoke arises from the letter, 'r', in the word Arham, lighting up a great fire which, the meditator in his vision finds, burns down the lotus and his internal and external bodies. Thereafter, the meditator has the *Mārūti-dhāraṇā*, in which he has the vision of a great storm blowing away the ashes. The meditator in the fourth stage of this contemplation, called the *Vāruṇi-dhāraṇā*, finds clouds pouring down torrents

of water which wash off the ashes of his body. In the next phase of Dhāraṇā, called the Rūpavatī, the meditator has the vision of himself as an excellent being, similar in qualities to an omniscient being and seated on a throne, well-respected by gods.

2. In the Padastha-dhyāna, the meditator contemplates over the letters of the sacred Mantra or formula.

3. In the Rūpastha-dhyāna, the meditator has the vision of the Arhat, surrounded by his devotees and disciples, shining brilliantly like a collection of suns and teaching truths to the assembly.

4. The last is the Rūpātīta meditation. At this highest stage of contemplation, the meditator has the realisation of himself as a perfectly immaterial being like the Siddhas.

The above then is the nature and the method of Dhyāna or meditation. The Jaina thinkers insist that the Mahā-Mantra is to be meditated upon and not simply to be uttered. Its utterance, no doubt has its effect, place and importance but the full efficiency of the Mahā-Mantra will be manifested on its meditation in the last of the above manners. Accordingly, the Mahā-Mantra is not only to be repeated ('Javaha') but to be meditated upon ('Jhaeha').

The full effectuation of Mahā-Mantra depends on the first effort. One begins with the proper disposition, as indicated before. He is to meditate upon the Mahā-Mantra in a right way i.e. by freeing his mind from all forms of the Ārta and the Roudra dhyānas, purifying it through the Dharma-dhyāna

and by being absorbed in the highest form of the Śukla-dhyāna, after passing through its preparatory stages. To realise the object of the Mahā-Mantra in his meditation i. e. to have a direct vision of it, the meditator should first isolate himself mentally from all things and phenomena of the external world and be perfectly self-absorbed. This is best effected through the contemplation, described above as the Pīṇastha. Thereafter, he utters the Mahā-Mantra and meditates upon its wording, having the Padastha-dhyāna, as described above, regarding all the five groups of the Paramēṣṭhis, indicated in the Mahā-mantra. At the next stage, he has the Rūpastha-dhyāna or a clear vision of the Arhat in his brilliant appearance and with all his excellent attributes. Last in the scale of meditation, he has the Rūpatīta contemplation about the Siddha.

This is the culminating stage in which the meditator realises that he too is in reality, a disembodied being like the Siddha, of an immaterial and a purely spiritual nature.

The Mahā-Mantra and its realisation show the all-comprehensive nature of the Jaina religious consciousness. If for the purposes of worship of an ordinary form, God is taken as a being of infinite power, bliss and intelligence, external to the worshipper, if in deference to the religious tendencies of the Indian minds, God is conceived as a corporeal being of superhuman attributes, if for persons of a more spiritual disposition, God is looked upon as the prophet, revealer and the teacher, the Jainas would point to the Arhat. Then

again if the life of a religion requires that the teachings of its Messiah, or its prophet should be kept alive, acted up to and propagated by an undecaying Church, i.e. a line of unselfish and sincere believers, the Jaina Ācāryyas, Upādhyāyas and Sādhus would answer the requirement both individually and collectively. If again the essentiality of a rational religion consists in a form of God-consciousness, in which God does not appear as a being foreign to the nature of man but a being who by continuous self-culture and self-development has finally realised the capacities of spiritual perfection, inherent in him, then the Siddha as conceived by the Jainas, would exactly be the God of such a rational religion. The Trinity of God, God, the Father. God, the Son and God, the Holy Spirit, may be found in a truly rational sense in the high-souled beings, indicated in the Mahā-Mantra. If the true God is found in a true Scripture then the Mahā-Mantra having for its objects truly divine beings, can be looked upon as the truly holy Scriptural revelation.

The Namaskāra-Mahā-Mantra thus gives us an insight in the nature of the Jaina religion. If by religion is meant a belief in a creator-God, the Jaina religion would surely be outside the class of such a religion. A rational religion, however, does not see the necessity of a belief in a world-architect but is not to be condemned as atheistic on that account. The God in a rational religion is but the soul developed to perfection, with all its essential capacities fully realised. An infinite consciousness, an unbounded power (though under no necessity

of being actually used or exercised) and a limitless state of joy inheres in such a perfected self i. e. in the God of a rational religion, who is thus completely unconnected with all manners of imperfections and limitations of the ordinary empirical existence. A rational religion claims that it is the true and the purest conception of God. The Jaina religion is certainly a rational religion of this type and its faith in such a God saves it from the charge of atheism ; for, the Jaina religion is assuredly not atheistic. Its God or Gods are the five groups of high-souled beings and in revering them, the Jaina really reveres the divinities which are their essential attributes. The offering of prayers to and the meditations of the God in Jainism-as in the highest form of a rational religion,-are perfectly disinterested. No favours are sought from the God or the gods and the result of the divine worship is simply the development and perfection of one's own self. This self-development and self-perfection do not depend on the grace of God or any external being but are due to pure self-culture. This does not mean that a faith in God is unnecessary, that the Mahā-Mantra is useless or that the contemplation of the pure nature of God can be dispensed with. No : the Mahā-Mantra indicates the nature of the beings who have perfected themselves and shows that associations with pure beings in contemplation raise one in the scale of spiritual uplift. The Comtian positivism is also looked upon as a rational religion but its claim to satisfy the religious feeling of man by substituting in the place of God, such unreal and imaginary

things as 'Humanity' etc. etc. is but unfounded. The Jaina religion dispenses with the idea of a creator-God on logical grounds but does not do away with the real God or perfect beings to whom reverence can profitably be paid, although it does not seek any favours, whatsoever from them. The God or Gods of Jainism do not actually participate in the matter of the spiritual progress of their devotees but these are nevertheless spiritually uplifted by their worship, as if by a law of nature. This is the true meaning of the Jaina worship. The ultimate and the real aim of all religious worship is what is called the Niṣṣaya Dhyāna, in which one's self as an immaterial (Rūpātīta) being i.e. self as it truly is, is realised. The immediate and the unconditional cause of this ultimate self-realisation is of course the perfect abstraction of the self from all that is non-self. But the reverence paid to the great beings indicated in the Mahā-Mantra is the practical, though mediate, way to this Niṣṣaya Dhyāna—"Paramparā-Kāraṇa" as Brahma-dēva, the commentator of the Dravya-Saṃgraha, repeatedly puts it.

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